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ABSTRACT
Virtually three-quarters of a century ago, the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette recognized that the First Amendment protects citizens from being forced to speak. Often, new legal
doctrines are announced cautiously and narrowly in anticipation of future judicial development. Not so with
Barnette. The Court boldly proclaimed that the right to be free from state-compelled affirmation is so fundamental that it stands as the one “fixed star in our constitutional constellation” that cannot be moved. State
assertions of power that seek to coerce citizens to affirm government-approved ideas will inevitably fail, except
when narrowly tailored to prevent “grave and immediate” danger. The Justices further signified the force of this
doctrine by applying it to a curricular exercise mandated by public school teachers—those state officials who
regularly require young citizens to speak in our nation’s classrooms.
While the Court has since confirmed the breadth of the compelled speech doctrine in multiple contexts outside of
the classroom, its protections are now at risk of being eroded. Over the past seventy-four years, the size and scope
of the government’s role in education—particularly higher education—has increased dramatically. The federal
judiciary has largely accommodated this growth by granting public university officials more and more deference to
their policies and curricular choices. But recently, some courts have extended this deference to dilute Barnette’s
scope and force in the public university classroom. Indeed, two federal courts of appeals have held that curricular
exercises that coerce college students to affirm official ideas will only face minimal judicial scrutiny when challenged
in court. Another court of appeals held that such compelled speech claims are waived entirely when students choose
to enroll at a public university. Not only are the circuits split, but neither of these conflicting positions properly
respects the constitutional rights of students in the college classroom. Under these approaches, a public university
could use its curriculum to force its students to campaign for a political party, lobby for legislation, or even pledge
allegiance to a particular ideological position. This is not the legacy of Barnette.
This Article maintains that Barnette and its progeny require more rigorous and nuanced scrutiny—not deferential review—of public university curricular requirements that compel student speech. Only such an approach will
permit teachers to teach while respecting the first liberties of college students in a manner consistent with compelled
speech jurisprudence.
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The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues,
(rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.”
—Keyishian v. Board of Regents1

INTRODUCTION
Two college students each face a constitutional conundrum. Abigail is in
her final semester at a state teacher’s college and is in danger of failing out of
the program despite having a stellar GPA. One of the college’s curricular
mandates requires students in a capstone course to demonstrate a “respect
for diversity and a commitment to social justice.”2 As part of this requirement, all students must sign the college’s Statement of Diversity and Social
Justice. Abigail refuses to sign the statement because she disagrees with some
of its tenets. Her professor will not pass her, and she will not be permitted to
graduate if she will not sign the statement.
Lauren is in the first year of her Master of Advocacy and Political Leadership degree at a state university. In a course on political advocacy, her
professor is requiring all students to write a persuasive letter to the state legislature supporting the passage of HB 1122. This measure, if enacted, will
permit students, faculty, and visitors to carry handguns into any public university building in the state. Lauren, an ardent supporter of gun control legislation, refuses to write the letter on ideological grounds. Her professor
threatens to give her an “F” in the course if she fails to write the letter.3
Abigail and Lauren both choose to file suit on the grounds that the curricular requirements at their respective state institutions violate the First Amendment by compelling them to voice an ideological message with which they
disagree. Currently, the outcome of their respective lawsuits is an open question. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the measure of judicial
1
2

3

385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Columbia University’s Teachers College imposed a similar requirement on its students. See Columbia University: Ideological Litmus Tests at Teachers College, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/cases/columbia-university-ideological-litmus-tests-at-teachers-college
(last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining Columbia University’s Teachers College’s mandate that “requires students to demonstrate a ‘commitment to social justice’’’).
A student seeking a graduate degree in social work objected to a similar letter-writing assignment
at Missouri State University. See Elia Powers, Did Assignment Get Too Political?, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Nov. 1, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/01/complaint?width=775&height=500i&frame=true (discussing a student’s lawsuit against Missouri State University on the
grounds that a class assignment restricted her free speech by requiring her to support legislation
making gays and lesbians eligible to become foster parents).
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scrutiny courts should apply to compelled curricular speech in the public university context.4 Furthermore, the few circuit courts to have addressed the
matter are split. In the Eleventh Circuit, neither student would have a claim.5
In the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, they would both have a claim, but the
schools’ actions would be subject to minimal judicial scrutiny.6 No other federal court of appeals has directly tackled the matter, and the issue has received
only marginal scholarly attention. This silence in the law and scholarship is
unsettling, to say the least, as higher education moves to an experiential learning model that greatly expands the college classroom.7 Students learning under this modern model are often required to advocate for ideological viewpoints in “real-life” opportunities both on and off campus—and in several
high-profile cases, universities appear to have exploited teaching opportunities for political purposes.8 Thus, the question is ripe for review.

4

5
6

7

8

However, in Southworth, the Supreme Court addressed the compelled speech doctrine’s application
to compelled extracurricular speech. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 221 (2000) (holding that “[t]he First Amendment permits a public university to charge its
students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the
program is viewpoint neutral”).
See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining why plaintiffstudent could not prevail on her free speech claim against defendant-university).
See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim deserves to go before a jury even though “it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First
Amendment veto” over a university’s curriculum requirement); see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[n]eutral rules of general applicability ordinarily
do not raise free exercise concerns even if they incidentally burden a particular religious practice or
belief,” and are subject to rational basis review).
See Peter Stokes, Job Skills Increasing Focus of Many Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 4, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/10/04/job-skills-increasing-focus-many-collegesessay (“The pursuit of jobs or job readiness or real-world work experience seems to be the trend of
trends . . . . This can be seen in the growing focus on experiential learning opportunities—whether
it takes the form of internships and co-ops, or field research experiences, or participation in business
incubators, or any number of other kinds of outside-the-classroom learning experiences.”).
See, e.g., Citrus College: Compulsory Anti-War Speech, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/cases/citrus-college-compulsory-anti-war-speech (last visited July 16,
2017) (“A Citrus College professor had compelled undergraduate students to write anti-war letters
to President George W. Bush, penalizing the grades of students who dissented or refused to send
the letters.”); College Prof Makes Students Recite Anti-American ‘Pledge of Allegiance,’ FOX NEWS (Dec. 8,
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/12/08/college-prof-makes-students-recite-anti-american-pledge-allegiance.html (criticizing a Metropolitan State University of Denver professor who
required his students to recite an anti-American alternative to the Pledge of Allegiance); Kate Hardiman, Professors Tell Students: Drop Class if You Dispute Man-Made Climate Change, THE COLLEGE FIX
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/28825/ (recounting how “professors coteaching an online course called ‘Medical Humanities in the Digital Age’ at the University of Colorado–Colorado Springs recently told their students via email that man-made climate change is not
open for debate, and those who think otherwise have no place in their course”); Greg Lukianoff,
FAU College Student Who Didn’t Want to Stomp on ‘Jesus’ Runs Afoul of Speech Code, FORBES (Mar. 26,
2013, 8:37 PM), http://onforb.es/14mSzGO (discussing a Mormon student at Florida Atlantic
University who was charged with violating the school’s harassment policy when he refused to stomp
on a piece of paper with the word ‘Jesus’ on it as part of a class assignment); Missouri State University:
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This Article argues that current judicial approaches err by treating all compelled curricular speech claims the same and by subjecting them to a single
standard that excessively defers to university educators. A proper and complete inquiry would be much more rigorous. A court reviewing such a claim
should apply strict scrutiny when the purpose or effect of an academic exercise
compels a student to affirm a belief. A court may, however, employ a more
deferential standard toward university educators when they merely require students to speak information that does not implicate other constitutional rights.
Part I of this Article explores the development of the compelled speech
doctrine generally and examines the few cases that attempt to apply this doctrine to compelled curricular speech in the public university classroom. Part
II proposes a rigorous multi-tiered framework courts should apply when reviewing such claims, and Part III explains the legal justification for each part
of the proposed analysis. Part IV addresses and rebuts the primary objections to this framework, and Part V applies the proposed framework to a
variety of scenarios involving compelled speech at public universities.
I. THE COMPELLED CURRICULAR SPEECH PROBLEM
A. The Compelled Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court first formally recognized the compelled speech doctrine in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette9 by acknowledging that
the First Amendment10 generally precludes the government from telling people what they must say. The Court has developed this doctrine in four distinct
lines of cases in which the government has forced citizens or groups to “speak”

9

10

Political Litmus Test in School of Social Work, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/cases/missouri-state-university-political-litmus-test-in-school-of-socialwork (last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining that “Emily Brooker sued Missouri State University
(MSU) after she was threatened with expulsion and charged with violating MSU’s ‘Standards of
Essential Functioning’ for refusing to lobby the Missouri legislature on behalf of homosexual adoption”); Rhode Island College: Violation of Student’s Freedom of Conscience, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS.
EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/cases/rhode-island-college-violation-of-students-freedom-of-conscience (last visited July 23, 2017) (explaining that “[a]t Rhode Island College, graduate student Bill
Felkner was asked to publicly advocate ‘progressive’ social changes that he did not believe in. [His]
. . . professor . . . suggested . . . that if he did not agree with the school’s political philosophy, he
should consider leaving . . . .”); Nathan Rubbelke, Student Whistleblower: Diversity Class Presents Multiple
‘isms’ as Fact Without Allowing Debate, THE COLLEGE FIX (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/31130 (examining a UMass Amherst course that requires students to “act out
examples of racism to prove America is racist . . . [and] dominated by ‘white privilege’” without
opportunity for discussions or debates).
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that “the action of the
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control”).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
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in some manner. These case lines include instances of (1) “true” compelled
speech; (2) compelled association with third parties; (3) compelled statements
of fact; and (4) compelled subsidizing of the speech of others. Although the
first three lines are the ones most often implicated in the public university
classroom, a brief overview of all four lines is valuable for contextual purposes.
1. “True” Compelled Speech
Barnette was the first of three “true” compelled speech cases addressed by
the Court. In these cases, the government requires an individual or organization to personally express an ideological, state-approved message to which the
speaker objects. In Barnette, the Court held that the First Amendment prevented the State of West Virginia from compelling public-school children to
say the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag.11 It explained that the Bill of
Rights “guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind” by precluding the
state from coercing him “to utter what is not in his mind.”12 The Court further
reasoned that the compulsory pledge and salute exceeded the state’s power
because it invaded the “individual freedom of mind” by forcing the students to
affirm a belief.13 Many First Amendment controversies require the drawing of
fine distinctions, but the Court made it clear that this was not such a case:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.14

Barnette thus stands as a powerful confirmation of the limits of civil power over
the realm of ideas: The state may not purposefully compel its citizenry to
affirm government-approved opinions.
Thirty-three years later, in its second true compelled speech case, the
Court clarified the reach of Barnette when it reviewed a Jehovah’s Witness
couple’s challenge to a New Hampshire criminal law that required citizens
to carry the State motto—“Live Free or Die”—on car license plates.15 The
majority in Wooley v. Maynard reaffirmed that the “right to refrain from speaking” is part of the “individual freedom of mind” protected by the First
Amendment.16 Accordingly, individuals may “hold a point of view different

11
12
13
14
15

16

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 642.
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1977) (“The issue on appeal is whether the State of
New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the
motto ‘Live Free or Die’ on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their
moral and religious beliefs.”).
Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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from the majority” and “refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable.”17 Pursuant to these principles, the Court applied strict scrutiny to
the law and concluded that New Hampshire could not require the Maynards
to “becom[e] the courier for [the State’s ideological] message.”18 In dissent,
Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Barnette on the grounds that the
passive display of the state motto was not an affirmation of belief.19 The
majority disagreed, holding that being forced to carry the state’s preferred
message on one’s personal property—like being compelled to salute the
flag—is an invasion of “the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control.”20 Thus,
the government can neither compel citizens to personally affirm a belief (Barnette) nor force them to foster a belief to third parties such that their endorsement is reasonably presumed (Wooley).21 In other words, the prohibition on
compelled speech encompasses both actual and apparent affirmations of officially coerced viewpoints.
The Court affirmed the breadth of this prohibition by holding that even
indirect compulsion could transgress the First Amendment. In AID v. Alliance
for Open Society International, Inc.,22 the Court reviewed a congressional funding
condition that required recipients to “explicitly agree with the Government’s
policy to oppose prostitution and sex trafficking.”23 The Court found that
this condition violated the basic principle in Barnette and Wooley that the “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must
say.”24 The fact that the recipients could turn down the funds did not save
the condition because it amounted to a “pledge [of] allegiance to the Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution.”25 Furthermore, the majority
reprimanded the government for crossing the constitutional red line drawn
in Barnette—i.e., that no state official can prescribe orthodox thought and

17
18
19

20
21

22

23
24
25

Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 720–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Barnette is distinguishable because the New
Hampshire law did not “force[ ]” the Maynards to “‘assert[ ] as true’ the message” on the license
plate).
Id. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“For First Amendment principles to be implicated, the State
must place the citizen in the position of either apparently to, or actually ‘asserting as true’ the message.”).
See generally Agency for Int’l Dev. (AID) v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332
(2013) (“The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a
belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program. In so
doing, it violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained.”).
Id. at 2327.
Id.
Id. at 2332.
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force a citizen to affirm it.26 After AID, it is clear that this constitutional proscription extends to direct and indirect means of coercion.
Barnette, Wooley, and AID confirm that the government will face strict scrutiny if by direct or indirect action it forces its citizens to affirm an ideological
view, whether or not that is the government’s avowed purpose.
2. Compelled Association
In the second line of cases, the Court explained that the compelled speech
doctrine also prohibits the government from forcing citizens to host or accommodate a message expressed by a private third party, absent a compelling state interest.27 Thus, the Court voided a state “right of reply” statute
requiring any newspaper that criticized a political candidate to publish the
candidate’s response free of charge.28 Likewise, a plurality of the Court enjoined a state regulation that required a privately owned utility company to
carry in its billing envelopes the bulletin of one of its opponents.29 These
compelled access provisions transgressed First Amendment limits because
they “force[d] speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they
[did] not set.”30 The Court essentially treated the forced association with the
objectionable message as a direct assault on the content of the speaker’s message. And the First Amendment leaves the “choice[ ] of what to say and
what to leave unsaid”31 to the individual, not the government or a third party.
The Justices affirmed this speaker-autonomy principle in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston wherein the state applied its
public accommodation law to require parade organizers to include a lesbian,
gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) contingent to march in the annual St. Patrick’s
Day Parade.32 The Court found that this forced inclusion of the contingent

26

27

28
29
30
31
32

See id. (declaring that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)).
See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (“Notwithstanding that
it burdens protected speech, the Commission’s order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored
means of serving a compelling state interest.”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
260–61 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (“To justify this statute, Florida advances a concededly important interest of ensuring free and fair elections by means of an electorate informed about the
issues. But prior compulsion by government in matters going to the very nerve center of a newspaper—the decision as to what copy will or will not be included in any given edition—collides with
the First Amendment.”).
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244, 258.
See Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20–21 (finding that the “order [was] not a narrowly tailored means of
furthering a compelling state interest”).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1995).
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group would alter the expressive content of the organizer’s parade33 and
thereby compromise “the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message.”34
The choice of a speaker not to affirm a particular belief or viewpoint is presumed to “lie beyond the government’s power to control.”35 Failing to find
a compelling governmental justification, the unanimous Court held the law
unconstitutional as applied.36 These cases teach us that the state cannot force
a speaker to accommodate a third party’s speech when it is so closely connected to the original speaker that it will alter his preferred message by making it appear that he endorses the third party’s ideas.
3. Compelled Statements of Fact
The Court has also recognized that the speaker’s right to control his
speech “applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement,
but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.”37 The
seminal “compelled facts” case is Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc.,38 in which the Court addressed a state law that required professional solicitors to disclose their fee to prospective patrons prior to an appeal
for funds.39 Holding that the provision acted as a content-based speech regulation, the Court applied strict scrutiny and voided the law.40
On its face, the application of strict scrutiny to compelled statements of
fact would seem to invalidate innumerable federal and state regulatory programs that require the disclosure of purely factual information. Examples
such as tax returns, product-labeling laws, environmental disclosures, and corporate filings come readily to mind.41 Perhaps recognizing Riley’s breadth, the
33
34
35
36
37

38

39
40
41

Id. at 573.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 573. While the difference between facts and opinions may not always be clear, the Court has
made this distinction in the compelled speech context as well as other First Amendment contexts.
Most notably, the law makes this distinction in the defamation setting where “statement[s] on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation
law.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). Conversely, “a statement of opinion
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation
will receive full constitutional protection.” Id. at 20.
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988) (finding that both
“compelled statements of opinion” and “compelled statements of fact” burden constitutionally protected speech).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 798, 803.
See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (“So-called ‘compelled speech’ may under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence raise a
serious First Amendment concern where it effects a forced association between the speaker and a
particular viewpoint. What is at stake here, by contrast, is simply routine disclosure of economically
significant information designed to forward ordinary regulatory purposes—in this case, protecting
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Justices appear to have narrowed the decision’s reach somewhat without overruling it. The Court has since explained that Riley demanded strict scrutiny
because the compelled disclosure there acted as a “prior restraint[ ] on
[speech]” that would effectively kill the solicitation before it began.42 And
three years later, the Court applied a narrow reading of Riley to an Act of
Congress. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), the
Court upheld a funding condition that required universities receiving federal
aid to provide military recruiters access to students to the same extent as other
employers.43 Citing to Riley, an association of law schools that opposed the
military’s antidiscrimination policies sued, claiming that the condition forced
them to “speak” by sending emails and flyers on behalf of the recruiters.44
However, the Court found these “compelled statements of fact” to be a “far
cry from the compelled speech in Barnette and Wooley” because the schools
were not required to endorse a “Government-mandated pledge or motto.”45
Accordingly, the Court did not apply any form of heightened scrutiny, but
simply affirmed the government’s choice as a reasonable one.46
Similarly, in other cases regulating commercial speech, both the Supreme

42

43

44
45
46

covered entities from questionable PBM business practices. There are literally thousands of similar
regulations on the books—such as product labeling laws, environmental spill reporting, accident
reports by common carriers, SEC reporting as to corporate losses and (most obviously) the requirement to file tax returns to government units who use the information to the obvious disadvantage
of the taxpayer. The idea that these thousands of routine regulations require an extensive First
Amendment analysis is mistaken.” (first citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); then citing
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974))); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d
832, 849 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The State may not constitutionally require an individual to disseminate
an ideological message, but requiring a provider of storm sewers that discharge into national waters
to educate the public about the impacts of stormwater discharge on water bodies and to inform
affected parties, including the public, about the hazards of improper waste disposal falls short of
compelling such speech. These broad requirements do not dictate a specific message. They require
appropriate educational and public information activities that need not include any specific speech
at all.” (footnote omitted) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713)); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272
F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Finally, we note the potentially wide-ranging implications of [plaintiff’s] First Amendment complaint. Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the
disclosure of product and other commercial information. To hold that the Vermont statute is insufficiently related to the state’s interest in reducing mercury pollution would expose these longestablished programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a result is neither wise nor
constitutionally required.” (citations omitted)).
See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 616 (2003) (interpreting Riley to hold that requiring charities to disclose fees at the beginning of a telephone call could
prompt the answerer to hang up, ending the conversation as soon as it began).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 52, 60 (2006) (“Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal
funds.”).
Id. at 62 (“As FAIR points out, these compelled statements of fact . . . , like compelled statements
of opinion, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.”).
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
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Court and courts of appeals have permitted the government to require statements of fact without a compelling justification.47 Riley is still good law, but
the federal judiciary seems hesitant to apply its full force unless the compelled
disclosure acts as a prior restraint in a noncommercial context. Thus, compelled disclosures of fact are somewhat less likely to prompt strict scrutiny
than compelled affirmations of belief.
However, even compelled factual disclosures that might not trigger strict
scrutiny under the compelled speech doctrine can raise additional concerns
that may require heightened scrutiny under other constitutional provisions.
Indeed, the Court has provided guidance on “compelled facts” cases—
although not stylized as such—in which the coercion infringed upon, among
others, the rights of association, privacy, and due process. For example, in
NAACP v. Alabama, the High Court overturned a state court order requiring
the local chapter of the NAACP to disclose its membership lists to the state.48
The unanimous Court held that the forced release of such factual information must be “subject to the closest scrutiny”49 because it would effectively
restrain the “freedom to associate” and “privacy in one’s associations.”50
Similarly, in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court reviewed Arizona’s decision
to deny an applicant’s admission to the bar for refusing to answer questions
about whether she had, in the past, associated with certain political organizations.51 The Court paused to note that Arizona’s inquiry likely implicated
several constitutional provisions, but that it clearly violated her First Amendment rights.52 Because the compelled factual disclosures touched upon her
associations and beliefs, they had to be justified by compelling interests.53

47

48
49

50
51
52
53

See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), wherein the Court did
not apply strict scrutiny in upholding ethical rules requiring attorneys to disclose clients’ potential
liability for legal costs.
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser’s First
Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.
But we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 41 (noting various cases in which the courts of appeals refused
to apply strict scrutiny to state-mandated factual disclosures).
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“[S]tate action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”).
Id. at 461. “We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which
we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of
their constitutionally protected right of association. Such a ‘. . . subordinating interest of the State
must be compelling.’” Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
Id. at 462.
See generally Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1971).
Id. at 5 (“[W]hether or not there are other provisions [of the Constitution] that protect her, we think
the First Amendment does so here.”).
Id. at 6–7 (“When a State seeks to inquire about an individual’s beliefs and associations a heavy
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Likewise, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court examined a legislative inquiry
into a college professor’s political associations and the content of his lectures.54 Because these questions required him to reveal facts about his associations and beliefs, the court applied close scrutiny and voided the inquiry
as a violation of the professor’s right to due process.55
NAACP, Baird, and Sweezy serve as just a few reminders that the deference
sometimes afforded to officials who force factual disclosures under the compelled speech doctrine may give way if the coercion triggers other constitutional protections.
4. Compelled Funding
In the final and most extensive line of compelled speech cases, the Court
has reviewed government attempts to force individuals to pay for the speech
of others—for example, through mandatory union dues,56 compelled regulatory advertising,57 and mandatory student fees.58 The Court has often, but
not exclusively, applied heightened scrutiny59 to such efforts based on its conclusion that the First Amendment prevents the government from “compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.”60
Instrumental in the Court’s position has been Thomas Jefferson’s opinion
that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation

54
55

56

57
58
59

60

burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest.”).
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (“This case . . . brings before
us a question concerning the constitutional limits of legislative inquiry.”).
Id. at 254; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75 (1976) (confirming the Sweezy Court applied strict
scrutiny by citing to the Sweezy decision).
In considering this provision we must apply the same strict standard of scrutiny, for the
right of associational privacy developed in NAACP v. Alabama derives from the rights of the
organization’s members to advocate their personal points of view in the most effective way.
Id. (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v. United Foods, Inc.,
533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
See, e.g., Knox, 567 U.S. at 310 (“We made it clear that compulsory subsidies for private speech are
subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless two criteria are met.
First, there must be a comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a ‘mandated association’ among
those who are required to pay the subsidy. Such situations are exceedingly rare because, as we
have stated elsewhere, mandatory associations are permissible only when they serve a ‘compelling
state interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’” (citations omitted)); Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221 (holding that a public university
may charge its students a mandatory fee to fund extracurricular student speech if the program is
viewpoint neutral).
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410.
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of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”61 This line of cases
provides an additional limit on the government’s power to impose objectionable ideological viewpoints upon its citizens.
This overview of cases shows just how expansive and powerful are the
protections of the compelled speech doctrine. Except in rare circumstances,
the courts presume that the government has acted unconstitutionally when
it compels its citizens to speak. This is true of purposeful attempts to force a
citizen to affirm a belief as well as seemingly innocent ones that can change
a citizen’s message. The doctrine prohibits both direct and indirect government coercion, and it protects citizens who are actually speaking as well as
those who communicate only through association or symbolism. The compelled speech doctrine thus provides a strict line over which the government
can rarely cross.
B. Compelled Speech in the College Classroom
The principles gleaned from these cases provide broad protection for citizens to determine when and what they will speak free from government intrusion. How do these principles apply, however, when a student enters a
college classroom? The Supreme Court has cautioned that the First Amendment “must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”62 The judiciary has, in some cases, interpreted this maxim
to permit substantial deference to the academic decisions of university faculty. And such deference might seem uniquely appropriate in the compelled
speech context, given that students are regularly required to speak as a part
of the educational process. Only three federal courts of appeals have sought
to resolve this apparent constitutional conflict between the rights of students
and the prerogatives of university educators.
The Eleventh Circuit answered this question efficiently in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley by effectively foreclosing the availability of compelled curricular
speech claims altogether.63 Officials in Augusta State University’s graduate
counseling program imposed a curricular “remediation plan” upon first-year
student Jennifer Keeton in response to her classroom comments indicating
that she would not provide gay-affirming therapy to homosexual clients due
to her Christian beliefs.64 The remediation plan required Keeton to attend

61
62
63
64

Keller, 496 U.S. at 10 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35 n.31).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 874 (11th Cir. 2011). The author represented Jennifer
Keeton at the district court level.
Id. at 867.
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sensitivity training, to study resources aimed at improving counseling effectiveness with the GLBTQ population, to interact with members of that population, and to write monthly reflection papers about “what she learned”
from her experiences and how they “influenced her beliefs.”65 Based upon
these reflections, the faculty would “decide the appropriateness of her continuation in the counseling program.”66 Keeton refused to complete the remediation plan and instead filed suit, alleging that the plan violated the First
Amendment by compelling her to affirm the state’s orthodoxy on sexual ethics.67 The Eleventh Circuit declined to enjoin the remediation plan, holding
that this curricular mandate involved no coercion because Keeton “voluntarily enrolled” at ASU.68 The court’s blunt treatment of Keeton’s claim is
troubling. Logically, this principle would preempt compelled speech
claims—and many other constitutional claims—as soon as any student
chooses to matriculate.69 Thus, the door appears to be tightly shut against
compelled curricular speech claims in the Eleventh Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit opened the door slightly for such claims in Axson-Flynn
v. Johnson.70 Professors at the University of Utah threatened to remove Christina Axson-Flynn from the Actor’s Training Program for refusing to say certain offensive words when performing assigned scripts.71 Axson-Flynn sued
the university, alleging that the school’s requirement that she read her lines
as written—including those words offensive to her Mormon faith—constituted impermissible compelled speech.72 Relying on Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier,73 the court of appeals determined that Axson-Flynn’s speech was
“school-sponsored speech” which the university could regulate as long as it
did so for “legitimate pedagogical” reasons.74 The court thus determined
that Hazelwood’s minimal scrutiny would apply to all student speech claims

65
66
67
68
69

70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 878.
The court emphasized that the compelled speech doctrine announced in Barnette is simply “inapplicable” where enrollment is optional. Id. at 878. Keeton was free to “choose a different career” but
once she chose ASU, she lost her right to challenge any aspect of the curriculum. Id. “ASU has
conditioned participation in the clinical practicum and graduation on compliance with the ACA
Code of Ethics, and Keeton, having voluntarily enrolled in the program, does not have a constitutional
right to refuse to comply with those conditions.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Joseph J. Martins, First
Amendment Enclave: Is the Public University Curriculum Immune from the Sweep of the Compelled Speech Doctrine?,
50 TULSA L. REV. 157, 186–92 (2014) (further explaining the legal consequences of the Keeton
court’s reasoning).
See generally Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1289–90.
Id.
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that “occur[ ] in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”75 Therefore,
while the Tenth Circuit recognizes compelled curricular speech claims, college students bringing such claims can only prevail if they can show that the
curricular requirement is merely a pretext for discrimination.76
In Ward v. Polite, the Sixth Circuit concurred that Hazelwood is the proper
judicial standard for courts to apply to all university curricula that compel
student speech.77 There, Eastern Michigan University (“EMU”) officials expelled Julea Ward from the graduate counseling program when she requested the option to refer a client seeking gay-affirming counseling during
her third-year practicum.78 After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Ward sued, claiming that university officials violated the compelled speech
doctrine by forcing her to speak EMU’s preferred ideological position on
sexual counseling to a third party.79 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
practicum was part of EMU’s curriculum and, therefore, the court would
only disturb the expulsion decision if the defendants’ actions were not “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”80 Consequently, “it is
the rare day when a student [in the Sixth Circuit] can exercise a First Amendment veto over [the curriculum].”81
This survey of compelled curricular speech jurisprudence might cause a
plaintiff’s lawyer to pause before agreeing to sue on Abigail or Lauren’s behalf.
However, such concern is premature, because the heavy-handed approach
taken in these appellate court cases is inaccurate and unjustified; curricular
measures that compel college students to speak should be subject to a more
rigorous and nuanced analysis. This Article now turns to that approach.
II. THE COMPELLED CURRICULAR SPEECH FRAMEWORK
A court reviewing a claim that a public university compelled an objecting
student to speak as part of a curricular mandate should employ the following
analysis:
1. Is the purpose of the challenged activity to compel the student to
affirm a belief?

75
76

77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 1289.
See id. at 1287 (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the classroom in the name
of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class,
religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.”) (quoting Settle v. Dickson
Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012). The author represented Julea Ward at the
district court level.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 732, 740–41.
Id. at 734.
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If “yes,” the court must apply strict scrutiny. If “no,” go to 2.
2. Is the effect of the challenged activity such that the listeners would
reasonably presume the student was endorsing a belief?
If “yes,” the court must apply strict scrutiny. If “no,” go to 3.
3. Does the challenged activity impinge upon another constitutional right?
If “yes,” the court must apply the scrutiny appropriate for that
right. If “no,” go to 4.
4. Is the challenged activity a mere pretext for discrimination, or
does it further a “legitimate pedagogical” interest?
If the former, the assignment fails, but if the latter, the assignment will be upheld.
This framework is clearly more demanding than the one employed by
the Tenth and Sixth Circuits (not to mention the Eleventh). Assignments
that actually (Step 1) or apparently (Step 2) compel affirmation of belief will
face the most exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. The assignment
must be the “least speech-restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling—or
extremely strong—governmental interest.”82 This is scrutiny with real teeth.
Indeed, the Supreme Court mused in Barnette that it could not conceive of a
governmental interest that would justify the school’s officially coerced endorsement of an ideology.83 Similarly, in Ward, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that EMU’s expulsion of Ward would not survive strict scrutiny.84 Specifically, the court of appeals found the university’s interests in teaching the relevant code of ethics and maintaining its accreditation insufficient to justify its
“no-referral policy.”85 Moreover, even if the university could have proffered
a sufficiently “compelling interest,” that interest would not have justified the
expulsion because accommodating Ward’s religious scruples would have
been a less restrictive means of furthering the school’s concerns.86 Other
universities would almost surely fail this judicial standard because, as Justice
Souter has opined, such scrutiny “leaves few survivors.”87

82
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85
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DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech § 2.2, in LEGAL
ALMANAC SERIES (2012).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
Ward, 667 F.3d at 740 (“The university does not argue that its actions can withstand strict scrutiny,
and we agree. Whatever interest the university served by expelling Ward, it falls short of compelling.”).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 740 (“Allowing a referral would be in the best interest of Ward (who could counsel someone
she is better able to assist) and the client (who would receive treatment from a counselor better
suited to discuss his relationship issues).”).
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Curricular exercises that implicate constitutional interests beyond compelled speech (Step 3) may also face heightened scrutiny. As discussed above,
even when a university compels mere statements of fact, it may trample the
rights of association, privacy, and due process. A curricular exercise that
operates in this manner will also rarely survive.
However, this framework need not be insurmountable. Public educators
may require students to state facts or opinions as long as such curricular mandates do not compel affirmation of belief, violate other constitutional rights,
or target students for discrimination. Indeed, the majority of curricular interactions and assignments would easily survive this analysis. The deferential
approach employed by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits was surely motivated
by a desire to prevent unduly burdening the teaching methods of university
educators. But this obtuse methodology overlooks a body of legal precedent
confirming that curricular measures that compel college students to speak
should be subject to a more demanding and detailed analysis. This Article
will now address that precedent.
III. PRECEDENT SUPPORTING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
This Article’s primary contribution to this issue relates to Steps 1 and 2,
because they reverse the circuit courts’ presumption of the constitutionality
of university curricula. These steps subject curricular exercises to strict scrutiny when they force students to actually or apparently affirm a belief. Accordingly, the majority of this section will be dedicated to discussing the precedent that justifies such exacting scrutiny. Moreover, these two inquiries will
be considered together because—as will be discussed below—they are simply
different forms of the same type of constitutional invasion. This section will
also discuss the legal support for Step 3, simply to point out that a court must
be aware that compelled statements of fact or opinion could implicate other
constitutional concerns beyond compelled speech. Finally, because some
compelled curricular speech directives do not implicate the constitutional interests protected by Steps 1 through 3, this section will partially concur with
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ application of Hazelwood for Step 4 claims.
A. Steps 1 and 2: Compelled Affirmations of Belief
1. Barnette and Wooley
The pre-eminent precedent supporting the application of strict scrutiny to
curricula that compel students to affirm a belief is Barnette itself. In fact, the
case is on all fours, so to speak. Barnette addressed a compelled speech claim in
which a public educational institution forced students to affirm an ideological
viewpoint as part of a curricular mandate. In this context, the Court made it
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clear that judges must apply no less than the most rigorous judicial scrutiny.
While the Barnette decision addressed a grade-school compulsion, the decision applies even more forcefully to public institutions of higher learning,
due to the unique nature of the university and the maturity of the students.88
It is axiomatic that universities hold a distinctive place in our constitutional
heritage that requires special constitutional protection. The “college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”89
This marketplace is necessary to generate new ideas to drive both innovation
and public policy so that our society will not “stagnate and die.”90 For this
environment to function properly, college students are granted maximum freedom of thought and inquiry.91 Indeed, the “vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”92 There is simply no room for the view that such freedoms “apply
with less force on college campuses” than they do in primary and secondary
school classrooms.93 Moreover, minors roam the halls of K-12 public schools
while university campuses are inhabited almost exclusively by adults. The
First Amendment rights of schoolchildren “are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”94 For this reason, public secondary
and elementary schools “are granted more leeway” to regulate student
speech than public colleges and universities.95 The rights of the former serve
as a constitutional floor under which no government schools may tread.
Therefore, if public school administrators have any power to compel speech,
their university counterparts have less. Speech regulations that fail in the
pre-collegiate school context must fail in the university setting. Consequently,
if Barnette is good law for primary and secondary schools, by logical extension,
it must be good law for public universities.96
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92
93
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See Martins, supra note 69, at 182 (“While the Barnette opinion was issued in the pre-collegiate context, the nature of the environment and the age of the students in higher education both cut in favor
of extending Barnette’s reasoning to the university setting.”).
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (“[The] danger
[of chilling speech] is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”).
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
Id. at 180.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sypniewski
v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for federal courts to apply pre-collegiate precedent to the collegiate environment. For example, the Axson-Flynn and Ward courts of appeals utilized Hazelwood v.
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Barnette also explains the limits the compelled speech doctrine imposes
upon state-mandated curriculum. While some subsequent courts and commentators have attempted to characterize Barnette as noncurricular, such attempts falter in light of the facts of the case and the Supreme Court’s current,
broad understanding of what constitutes a school’s “curriculum.”97 In Barnette, West Virginia specifically adopted the pledge in response to the Gobitis
decision in which the Supreme Court previously upheld the ceremony as a
permissible application of Pennsylvania’s “educational policy.”98 The West
Virginia legislature amended its education statutes to require all schools to
include “courses of instruction in history, civics, and in the Constitutions of
the United States and of the State ‘for the purpose of teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the knowledge
of the organization and machinery of the government.’”99 The Board of Education then implemented the flag salute as “a regular part of the program of
activities in the public schools” in order to comply with this directive.100 When
the board created its “program of activities” in order to “teach[ ], foster[ ],
and perpetuat[e]”101 patriotic principles for the purpose of “increasing . . .
knowledge,”102 it was patently employing its curriculum. The Supreme Court
has since implicitly confirmed this conclusion by explaining that a school’s
curriculum is broadly defined: “[A]ctivities may fairly be characterized as part
of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
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102

Kuhlmeier—a decision rendered in the high school context—to derive a judicial standard for compelled speech claims in the university setting. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262; Ward v. Polite,
667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir.
2004). This specific application was flawed, as explained more fully in Subpart IV.B., infra, because
the Tenth and Sixth Circuits applied Hazelwood as a ceiling—rather than a floor—on the rights of
college students. Nevertheless, these decisions demonstrate that court opinions applicable to secondary school students can be pertinent to university students as long as the unique nature of the
university and the maturity of its students is appropriately considered.
See, e.g., Ward, 667 F.3d at 734. The Ward court opined that First Amendment protection for student
speech varies depending upon how closely it is related to the curriculum. Id. The more student
speech has to do with the curriculum, the less it is protected. Id. Conversely, the less speech has to
do with the curriculum, the less likely it is that schools will be able to justify its restriction. Id. The
Sixth Circuit then concluded that the speech involved in Barnette was essentially noncurricular, and
was for that reason entitled to greater constitutional protection. Id. “Barnette involved forced individual expression that happened to occur in a school, while Hazelwood involved restricted student
expression through the school’s newspaper.” Id.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (“The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by those
compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our independent
judgment. . . . [T]he courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy.” (emphasis
added)).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625 & n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).
Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 625 n.1 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).
Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).
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impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”103 The pledge and salute imposed upon the Barnette children plainly
fit this description. Pennsylvania and West Virginia school officials, as well as
the Justices in Gobitis104 and Barnette, all recognized the pledge and salute ceremony for what it was: a mandatory curricular exercise.105
The curricular nature of the pledge, however, did not constrain the majority from applying strict judicial scrutiny. Unlike the Axson-Flynn and Ward
courts, the High Court plainly rejected any form of deferential analysis:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include . . . power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have
a ‘rational basis’ for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They
are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect.106

The Justices went even further by reasoning that when the state compels
speech it must provide “even more immediate and urgent” justification than
103
104

105

106

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940) (“But it is a very different thing for this
Court to exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise
will best promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the
institutions of their country.”).
At least one commentator has challenged the notion that the pledge was an academic exercise
because the Barnette majority “made a point of indicating that the school board ‘did not adopt the
flag salute because it was claimed to have educational value.’” See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court
and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1413 (2000) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 n.12). Yet,
this position overlooks the immediate and overall context in which the footnote was given, both of
which confirm the Court was addressing the state’s power to educate. Regarding the former, the
Court placed the footnote in the middle of its explanation that the school could not “short-cut” the
process of “teaching by instruction and study” with a “compulsory salute and slogan.” Barnette, 319
U.S. at 631. And the footnote itself cited to research challenging the effectiveness of the pledge as
an educational tool. Id. at 631 n.12. Moreover, the Barnette Court framed the entire context of its
opinion as a re-visitation of the decision in Gobitis to defer to the state’s “educational policy.” Gobitis,
310 U.S. at 598, overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argument in that case and in this, that
power exists in the State to impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in general. . . . The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under
our Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of this power and, against
this broader definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific grounds assigned for the Gobitis
decision.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635–36 (second emphasis added). If Barnette addressed a non-curricular exercise, there would have been no need to re-examine Gobitis. Barnette, however, expressly addressed
the constitutional limits to public schools’ authority over curricular policy. Therefore, the position
that West Virginia did not adopt the pledge as part of the curriculum is simply untenable. Footnote
twelve, in this light, simply stands for the proposition that the Barnette Court recognized the mandatory pledge as an ineffective educational method.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639 (emphasis added); see also id. at 633–34 (“But here the power of compulsion
is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear
and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression.”).
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when it silences speech.107 And the Court confessed that it was unaware of any
instance in which the state could coerce adoption of a belief in the educational context.108 Barnette thus commands the application of at least strict
scrutiny to curricula that impel student speech.
Of course, this is not entirely surprising given that, historically, most compelled speech regulations have faced heightened examination.109 What is
critical for purposes of this Article is to discern what precisely triggers this
standard in the public university curricular context—a context in which
three federal circuit courts have found little or no scrutiny to be appropriate.
The Barnette majority explained that this threshold question must be addressed as a matter of power, and the state generally lacks the power to compel its citizens to affirm a belief.110 In other words, any authority the state
may have to educate terminates at the point at which the state forces someone to affirm an ideology.111 It is at this point that the state impermissibly
“invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control.”112
While intrusions of this sort may take many forms, the Supreme Court has
categorized two forms of compelled affirmations that presumptively violate the
First Amendment. These invasions are represented in Steps 1 and 2, respectively, of the proposed framework. The first form was present in Barnette itself
because West Virginia purposefully coerced its students to revere the United
States government by word and symbol.113 The school system was free to
teach the students about American history and government, but it was not at
liberty to intentionally command patriotism through a mandatory pledge and
107
108
109
110
111

112
113

Id. at 633.
Id. at 642 (“If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us.”).
See supra Subparts I.A.1–4.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Id. at 635–36. As the Court stated in Barnette:
It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to
salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty. The Gobitis decision,
however, assumed, as did the argument in that case and in this, that power exists in the State
to impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in general. The Court only examined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned
general rule. The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a
ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the
individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of this power and, against
this broader definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific grounds assigned for the
Gobitis decision.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 633 (“Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as
presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of
the political ideas it thus bespeaks.”).
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salute backed by administrative and criminal penalties. The school’s purpose
to force each student to affirm a belief was plain in that each student who did
not “pledge allegiance to the Flag”114 faced expulsion and rendered their parents
liable to prosecution for truancy.115 But this official purpose was fatal because
it “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations” on the state’s authority.116 Similarly, a public university presumptively may not employ its curriculum for the
purpose of coercing a student to affirm an ideological view.
The second type of presumptively invalid coercion (represented in Step
2) arose in Wooley where the law required drivers to serve as “mobile billboard[s]” for the state’s motto.117 The Wooley Court held that the regulation
failed to advance any compelling state interest.118 The majority explained
further that New Hampshire’s regulation would fail even if it was supported
by a legitimate purpose119 because it was simply another form of the compulsion prohibited in Barnette.120 This state mandate forced the Maynards to
disseminate the state’s ideological motto in a way that others would reasonably perceive as conveying the Maynards’ endorsement.121 This often occurs

114
115
116
117
118
119

120

121

Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
Id. at 629 (stating that students who failed to conform would be expelled and their parents would
be subject to criminal prosecution for truancy).
Id. at 642.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
Id. at 716–17.
Id. As the Court stated in Wooley:
Even were we to credit the State’s reasons and “even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.”
Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
Id. at 715 (“Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement
upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the
difference is essentially one of degree.”).
This is not to be confused with the “reasonable observer” in Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement”
test for Establishment Clause cases. See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In the compelled speech context, the concern is that viewers will mistakenly
associate the plaintiff with a government-imposed message which the plaintiff opposes. While the
Court has not fully developed this reasonable association principle, it has provided a guidepost and
a few examples of its application. In Hurley, the Court explained that this misattribution can occur
when the plaintiff is “intimately connected” with the government-imposed message. See Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995). The Court
has found sufficient potential for misattribution present to trigger strict scrutiny when speakers were
forced to carry the government’s message on their private property (Wooley), distribute another’s
message in their envelopes (Pacific Gas), and include an unwelcome contingent of marchers within
their private parade (Hurley). On the other hand, the Court has explained that persons are not likely
to associate government messages on United States currency with the carrier, Wooley, 430 U.S. at
717 n.15, nor would the private messages expressed by patrons at a shopping mall be attributed to
the mall’s owner. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). Additionally,
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when the “dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a
speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced.”122 In the
Court’s view, forcing a citizen to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence”123 to an offensive viewpoint gives the appearance of endorsement.
And such forced association is as constitutionally objectionable as if the government overtly intended to compel the citizen to adopt that viewpoint, because, in the eyes of the listeners, the speaker has in fact adopted that viewpoint.124 Strict scrutiny is thus also triggered when government action has
the effect of compelling a citizen to convey the government’s ideology to others where it might be reasonably perceived to be the citizen’s own message.
Barnette and Wooley, therefore, provide the threshold inquiries for reviewing compelled curricular speech claims at public universities. In Barnette, the
Court explained that public schools will face strict scrutiny when they utilize
their curriculum for the purpose of compelling affirmation of an orthodoxy.
Likewise, Wooley clarified that the government will face this same scrutiny,
notwithstanding the government’s purpose, when it impels a citizen to speak
an orthodox view to others if that message could be reasonably attributed to
the citizen. The Wooley Court’s extension of Barnette to public highways implies that this type of forced association could occur both inside and outside
the traditional classroom. The First Amendment therefore requires courts
to examine both the purpose (Step 1) and the effect (Step 2) of curricular mandates that compel student speech. When such mandates compel students
either to actually or apparently affirm a state-preferred position on a matter of
opinion, the reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny.
2. Companion First Amendment Provisions
The strict scrutiny standard is likewise supported by companion provisions contained in the Constitution. Indeed, the Barnette majority refused to
limit its decision to the free exercise claim brought by the plaintiffs, but rather
decided to rest its decision on broader First Amendment principles.125 Federal courts often consider related provisions of the First Amendment when

122
123
124

125

the Court found that simply permitting military recruiters on campus could not be viewed as endorsement of the military’s antidiscrimination policies. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst.
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65 (2006). These cases suggest that the Court’s threshold for potential
misattribution is set quite low in order to prevent the risk of endangering speaker autonomy.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63 (“The compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases, however,
resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was
forced to accommodate.”).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1943) (“While religion supplies appellees’
motive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share
these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.”).
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addressing a First Amendment claim.126 Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate to examine companion lines of First Amendment jurisprudence to determine how courts should address compelled curricular speech claims. An
analysis of the religion clauses, their historical roots, and the freedom of association confirms that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for reviewing curricular mandates that compel college students to affirm a belief or
profess a belief to others.
a. The religion clauses
The religion clauses preclude the government from “mak[ing] [a] law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”127 The Establishment Clause stops the civil government from engaging in activities that fall within the realm of religion, while the Free Excercise Clause “protects against the danger that civil government will interfere with or even persecute those exercising their religious liberties.”128
Scholars and judges have fiercely debated for decades the precise protections
encompassed by these clauses. However, the Supreme Court has provided
at least one immovable guidepost: The right to believe and profess a religious
belief is absolute. “The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus,
the First Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’ The government may not compel affirmation of religious
belief. . . .”129 The Court has said the same with respect to the Establishment
Clause: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . force
[a person] to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs . . . .”130
This point deserves emphasis. While the government may sometimes infringe upon religiously motivated conduct when regulating private citizens, it
may not punish mere belief or the profession of belief.131 Government actions
126

127
128
129
130
131

See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971) (noting that the free exercise of religion,
the freedom of conscience, the freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and petition, and
the freedom of association were considerations in the Court’s analysis).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Jeffrey C. Tuomala, The Casebook Companion pt. 9, ch. 1, at 1 (Feb. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1993) (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (emphasis added).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.”). Of course, there are spheres in which it might be necessary, and thus appropriate, for the government to regulate some beliefs to a limited extent. For example, when a citizen
leaves the private sphere and becomes a public official, the Constitution itself requires the public
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that compel belief or profession of belief are thus subject to the strictest judicial
scrutiny under the religion clauses. It would seem that the same scrutiny
would be appropriate for government actions that compel affirmation of belief
under the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, this is the central holding of Barnette.
This principle can be traced back to the efforts of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison to secure religious liberty in Virginia. The Supreme Court
and most legal scholars have recognized their writings in this context as being
foundational to the protections embodied in the First Amendment religion
clauses.132
Jefferson wrote the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in order to
disestablish the Anglican Church in Virginia. He opened his draft bill with
a fundamental tenet: “Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations . . . are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion . . . .”133 Jefferson reasoned from this principle that the Virginia
government could not compel its citizens to support the Anglican Church
because the government has no authority whatsoever to govern in the realm
of opinions. Indeed, Jefferson argued, the civil magistrate who does so immediately “destroys all religious liberty.”134 Significantly, Jefferson leaves no
room for any potential governmental interest that might justify such a severe
intrusion into the conscience.
Madison concurred with Jefferson’s views in his efforts to prevent Virginia from adopting a bill to provide public support to “teachers of the Christian religion.”135 In his famous “Memorial and Remonstrance,” Madison
asserted, “[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that religion
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it,
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.’”136
Madison argued that this “unalienable right” to religious liberty extended to
the “opinions of men” and thus encompassed “a freedom to embrace [and]

132
133
134
135

136

servant to take an oath or affirmation that he will uphold and defend the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President of the United States of America to take an oath or
affirmation prior to entering office); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (stating that Senators and Representatives, as well as all members of the state legislatures and “all executive and judicial [o]fficers”
are “bound by [o]ath or [a]ffirmation.”).
Tuomala, supra note 128, pt. 9, ch. 1, at 2.
Thomas Jefferson, 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, FOUNDERS ONLINE (June 18, 1779),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082.
Id.
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (June
20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1784–1786, 298–99 (Robert A. Rutland
et al., eds., 1973). This principle is now enshrined in Article I, § 16 of the Virginia Constitution.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
Id. at 299.
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to profess” one’s religion free from government interference.137 Consequently, Madison contended that Virginia lacked the power to compel men
to furnish financial support for the teachers of one religion or religion in general.138 Like Jefferson, Madison shut the door on any potential for legitimate
government rule over the opinions of men.
Jefferson and Madison, therefore, both concluded that religious liberty
exists because the civil government does not have jurisdiction over the beliefs
and opinions of men. This maxim finds even deeper roots in classical schools
of jurisprudence. Thomas Jefferson famously relied upon the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” in the Declaration of Independence as the justification for breaking with England and the foundation of our unalienable
rights.139 Under this classical view, government authorities are empowered
to protect society by “execut[ing] wrath on him who practices evil.”140 However, governing officials are consequently limited in that they may only punish evil works. Matters of the heart or mind—including the opinions of men—
are not external actions, and therefore simply lie beyond the authority of the
government to punish. In Jefferson’s own words, “the opinions of men are
not the object of civil government nor under its jurisdiction.”141 The jurisdiction of the civil government does not begin until “principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order.”142
137
138

139

140
141
142

MADISON, supra note 135, at 299–300.
See id. at 300.
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this
prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of
the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We
revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? [T]hat the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?
Id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). According to Sir William Blackstone,
“[u]pon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws;
that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *42. Blackstone clarified that the “the revealed or divine law [is] to be found only
in the holy scriptures” and that it takes precedence over man’s law. Id.
This law of nature, being co-equal with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at
all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately from this original.
Id. at *41.
Romans 13:1–4 (NKJV).
Tuomala, supra note 128, pt. 9, ch. 2, at 11.
Id. The jurisdictional limits on forms of compelled speech were not foreign to the founders. In fact,
the religious test clause expressly prevented the new government from excluding persons from federal office who did not profess the religion of the majority. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Such
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The Supreme Court has adopted the jurisdictional approach supported
by Jefferson and Madison when reviewing governmental action that compels
one to profess a religious belief or doctrine. In Torcaso v. Watkins,143 for example, the Court reviewed a provision in the Maryland Constitution that
required public officers to “declar[e] [a] belief in the existence of God.”144
The Court first reaffirmed that both religion clauses bar the government
from “forc[ing] a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”145
The Court then held that this clear prohibition doomed the enforcement of
the Maryland provision.146 It is significant that the Court did not apply a
balancing test but simply struck the provision as a patently “unconstitutional[ ] inva[sion] [of] the appellant’s freedom of belief and religion.”147
This is a textbook example of the most stringent form of judicial scrutiny.
The sources referenced above—the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, the Memorial and Remonstrance, ancient Scriptures, and the Torcaso
opinion—all have obvious implications for judicial scrutiny over compelled
speech claims. Jefferson, Madison, and Torcaso addressed religious liberty
violations that mirrored classic instances of compelled speech. While Jefferson and Madison battled forms of compelled subsidies, Torcaso involved
“true” compelled speech. Moreover, neither the historical authors nor the
Justices seemed to permit any government justification for these intrusions.
In fact, they have spoken with one voice when the state has sought to coerce
a citizen to believe or profess a belief. All such compulsions—whether they
force one to pay for a church, support religious teachers, or profess a belief
in God—transgress the freedom of religion because the government has no
power to regulate the mind or the opinions of men.
This principle would seem to operate with similar force when a public
school compels a citizen to affirm an ideological belief or to profess that belief
to others. Indeed, the Barnette Court said as much when it explained that the

143
144
145
146
147

religious loyalty tests have been condemned even by ancient writers. For example, the Bible records
the story of Daniel, who refused to obey King Darius’s law mandating that all persons must pray
only to the King. See Daniel 6:6–9 (NKJV). Daniel was cast into the lion’s den for disobeying this
archetypical compelled speech law. See id. at 6:16. After being released, Daniel explained to King
Darius: “My God sent His angel and shut the lions’ mouths, so that they have not hurt me, because
I was found innocent before Him; and also, O king, I have done no wrong before you.” Id. at 6:22
(emphasis added). Daniel explained to Darius that he had done no civil wrong because the King
had no jurisdiction to command the duty of worship from him; this duty was owed only to God,
and as Madison would affirm, could “be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence.” MADISON, supra note 135, at 299.
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Id. at 489 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 495 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 496.
Id.
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plaintiffs’ religious scruples were part of a broader “liberty of the individual,”148 and the Torcaso Court cited to Barnette for support.149 The West Virginia Board of Education thus had no more power to compel religious students to affirm a belief than it did students who merely objected on
philosophical grounds. Therefore, when public education officials invade the
mind in this manner, their actions must be subject to the strictest judicial
scrutiny, whether the plaintiff brings a free exercise, establishment clause, or
compelled speech claim.
b. Freedom of association
The Supreme Court’s freedom of association jurisprudence also supports
the application of strict scrutiny to compelled affirmations of belief, whether
actual or apparent. The Court has recognized that implicit in the First
Amendment is the “right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends.”150
This right is burdened when the government “forces [a] group to accept
members it does not desire,” and the forced inclusion “impair[s] the ability
of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express.”151 This type of government interference can only be justified when
the action “serve[s] compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.”152 In this respect, the freedom of association operates as a bar to prevent group compelled speech. Essentially, the freedom
of association mirrors the compelled speech doctrine by preventing the government from coercing a group to express an unwanted message. That this
type of intrusion into the inner structure of a group is presumed to be unconstitutional strongly implies that the same principle can be applied when the
state invades the mind of an individual.
Hurley clearly illustrates this point. There, the Court explained why the
forced inclusion of an unwanted LGB contingent into a private parade violated the speech rights of the parade organizers. The lower state courts concluded that the public accommodations law did not seek to burden expression but simply to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation.153 The
Justices unanimously disagreed. The forced participation of the LGB contingent “would likely be perceived” as a message of support for its cause,154
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635 (1943).
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492 n.7.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (quotation and citation omitted).
Id. at 648 (quotation and citation omitted).
Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 563 (1995).
Id. at 575.
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and this apparent association violated the parade organizers’ right to autonomy over their own speech.155 Moreover, the Court considered that the state
might have applied its public accommodation law to the parade for the purpose of “produc[ing] speakers free of . . . biases.”156 But if this were the state’s
objective, then it was a “decidedly fatal” one.157
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people,
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech
Clause has no more certain antithesis.158

Accordingly, the Hurley Court held that the freedoms of speech and of association were implicated whether the purpose of the law was to require the
speakers to adopt a pro-LGB viewpoint or whether the mere effect was to communicate such a view to others. Either way, the state’s attempts to impose an
ideology upon the parade organizers were presumptively unconstitutional.159
Hurley’s lessons for compelled speech jurisprudence are palpable. The
state has no more power to compel a group to affirm a government-approved
idea than it does an individual. The textbook example of this occurs when
the purpose of state action is to compel private citizens to affirm an ideological belief with which they disagree (Step 1). But this also occurs when the
government forces private citizens to disseminate an offensive idea to others
such that it reasonably appears that those citizens endorse the idea (Step 2).
Hurley thus prohibited actual and apparent imposition of an orthodoxy, and it
relied heavily on Barnette to reach this conclusion. This citation signifies that
the compelled affirmation ban applies just as potently in the public school
classroom as it does in the public square.
A review of the principles underlying the compelled speech doctrine, the
religion clauses, and the freedom of association yields but one conclusion: The
government presumptively lacks the power to compel affirmation of an idea.
From Jefferson to Madison and from Barnette to Hurley, the authoritative voices
interpreting the principles of the First Amendment have consistently condemned state action that either (a) compels dissenters to affirm a belief or (b)
coerces them to associate with a belief in a way that makes it appear that they
have adopted that belief as their own. Whether the state has applied such
155

156
157
158
159

Id. at 576 (“Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a speaker
intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the
message is compromised.”).
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574–75 (1995) (“The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to
be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other
reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils
down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is
presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”).

114

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:1

force to secondary school students, taxpayers, car drivers, public servants, or
members of a parade, the law has demanded the strictest judicial scrutiny.
College students are entitled to no less protection in the college classroom. Consequently, a court reviewing a compelled curricular speech claim
must apply strict scrutiny if the curricular measure purposefully or effectively
compels a student to affirm an ideology under Step 1 or 2.
B. Step 3: Other Constitutional Provisions
Of course, many curricular exercises that require student speech will bypass Steps 1 and 2 of the proposed analysis because they do not force students
to affirm a belief. Nonetheless, such exercises can still severely impinge upon
other precious constitutional liberties. For example, an assignment in a human sexuality course that requires students to write a paper discussing the
number of sexual partners they have had would likely survive Steps 1 and 2.
Likewise, a political philosophy professor who requires his students to stand
up in class and reveal who they voted for in the last election could also escape
these steps.160 Neither exercise forces the students to adopt an orthodoxy,
yet these assignments would certainly implicate—at a minimum—the “freedom to associate” and “privacy in one’s associations.”161
These exercises are readily analogous to the type of coerced inquiries the
Supreme Court condemned in NAACP, Baird, and Sweezy, discussed supra in
Subpart I.A.3. In each of those cases, the Court reviewed the compelled
disclosure under the scrutiny appropriate to the relevant constitutional provision. Likewise, the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts followed this approach
160

161

There could be some debate here whether this question compels statements of fact or opinion. On
the one hand, the student’s choice of candidate in the last election is a verifiable fact. On the other
hand, that “fact” is related to the student’s political opinions and beliefs. This question would be
similar to the inquiry in Baird in which the state bar applicant was asked if “she had ever been a
member of the Communist Party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United
States Government by force or violence.’” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1971). The
plurality characterized the question as an inquiry about her “beliefs and associations.” Id. at 6–7.
Therefore, it is safe to say that compelled disclosures of fact about one’s beliefs, opinions, and/or associations, can activate other constitutional protections.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). A public institution may not require
a student to reveal intimate medical or sexual facts to the class as part of an academic exercise. The
Third Circuit touched on this privacy limitation when it addressed a school survey that sought
“intimate and private” information from students regarding “sexual activity, drug and alcohol use
and relationships.” See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 180 (3d Cir. 2005). The
court rejected the school’s threshold argument that, because it was mandated by the state to teach
about many of these topics, no constitutional claim could be made. “The scope of the right to
privacy is defined by the Constitution and may not be restricted by a state legislature or by state
education officials.” Id. at 178. However, the court ultimately concluded that no privacy interests
were implicated because there was no official compulsion and the survey results were completely
anonymous. Id. at 189. This liberty from compelled private facts in the curricular context is significant and requires further inquiry by the court when it is raised.
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when addressing the plaintiffs’ claims that their respective universities forced
them to speak words that violated their religious freedom. The Sixth162 and
Tenth163 Circuits appropriately subjected the challenged exercises to the
scrutiny required by the Free Exercise Clause. One can easily imagine a
number of other rights that could be at risk from such curricular mandates.
Consequently, a complete framework for analyzing compelled curricular
speech claims must encompass the protection of these additional freedoms.
C. Step 4: Catchall
Curricular exercises that require students to speak but do not force them
to affirm beliefs and do not implicate other liberties may be subject to Hazelwood as held by the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts.164 Most assignments will
fall into this category. These curricular exercises will satisfy this step as long
as they further “legitimate pedagogical” purposes and are not employed as a
“pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion.”165 However, Hazelwood cannot be blindly applied to the university classroom. This standard operates as a constitutional
baseline for liberty of speech in the university context. As discussed in Subpart III.A.1., the freedom of inquiry and thought available to adults in the
university classroom can be no less than the liberty afforded to minors in
primary and secondary schools. If high school teachers cannot target students for discrimination, then neither can college professors. So, for example, a teacher who required an African-American student to use a racial slur
in a class exercise would likely fail this test whether the assignment took place
in a grade school or university classroom.
While this standard is quite deferential to educators in general, a stricter
version of it must be utilized in academia to account for the special nature of
the university and the maturity of its students. University professors have
significantly less control over student speech than their grade-school colleagues do.166 A legitimate pedagogical concern in a high school government
162
163

164
165

166

Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that strict scrutiny was appropriate
because the university’s “no-referral policy” was not “neutral and generally applicable”).
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that summary judgment
on plaintiff’s free exercise claim was not appropriate because plaintiff adequately raised a genuine
issue as to whether the university maintained a policy of “individualized exemptions”).
Ward, 667 F.3d at 733–34; Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (citations omitted); see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 734 (“Although educators
may ‘limit[ ]’ or ‘grade[ ] speech in the classroom in the name of learning,’ and although they may
control their own speech and curriculum, the First Amendment does not permit educators to invoke
curriculum ‘as a pretext for punishing [a] student for her . . . religion.’”) (citations omitted).
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Public universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student speech than public elementary or high schools.”). Due to
the substantial differences between the university and the primary/secondary school context, the
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class may not be legitimate in a college political science course. So while
Hazelwood offers teachers some discretion when regulating student speech,
the standard has more teeth in the university classroom.167
IV. CONCEPTUAL OBJECTIONS
The proposal that a curricular requirement can face strict scrutiny when
it compels a student to affirm a belief (Steps 1 and 2) obviously has its challengers, and in this case those challengers include three federal courts of appeals. The opposing arguments raised by these courts and other commentators calling for minimal or deferential judicial review roughly fall into four
categories. The first and most radical argument maintains that students
waive their right to challenge the curriculum when they voluntarily accept
the benefit of a state-supported education. The second and more modest
position insists that the state should have greater control over the curriculum—including student responses to curricular assignments—because it is a
form of government speech. A related, pragmatic challenge maintains that
the educational process itself would collapse if public educators cannot compel student speech. The final challenge asserts that judges should defer to
academic decisions that oblige student speech because they lack the expertise
to adequately review such decisions. However, any surface appeal to these
various arguments vanishes upon closer examination because they fail to
overcome the aforementioned weight of authority demanding strict scrutiny
for curricular mandates that force students to affirm an ideology.
A. No Cause of Action
In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the position that
students simply have no grounds to bring a compelled speech claim against a

167

McCauley court emphasized that the Third Circuit has not adopted Hazelwood as a stand-alone measure for addressing student speech claims in the university setting. Id. The Ninth Circuit has similarly refused to apply Hazelwood’s student speech test to the university setting. See Oyama v. Univ.
of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015).
See McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247.
Public universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student speech than public
elementary or high schools. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain how this principle should
be applied in practice and it is unlikely that any broad categorical rules will emerge from
its application. At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other
decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools, cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities. Any application of free speech doctrine derived
from these decisions to the university setting should be scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.
Id.
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public university’s curriculum.168 The Keeton court reasoned that public universities condition access to state-supported education upon fulfilling the curriculum, and a student who “voluntarily enroll[s]” in a public university “does
not have a constitutional right to refuse to comply with those conditions.”169
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling effectively forecloses compelled curricular
speech claims and directly challenges the entire model proposed in this Article.
The first problem with the Keeton court’s “voluntary enrollment” theory is
that it violates over half a century of constitutional jurisprudence. It was true
in the first half of the twentieth century that citizens might waive some of their
constitutional rights as a condition of receiving certain government privileges,
such as funding, employment, or education.170 But this so-called “rights-privilege” doctrine eventually yielded to the rule that government “may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.”171 The triumphant
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is now firmly established and serves as
a bedrock of First Amendment freedom.172 The voluntary enrollment theory
is simply a thinly veiled return to the rights-privilege jurisprudence that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rebuffed in multiple settings, including the academic context. Indeed, in the landmark Tinker decision, the Court explained
that the state is not free to “impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses
upon attendance at public institutions of learning.”173 If the state cannot impose a constitutional waiver on high school students, it surely cannot do so to
prospective college students. The voluntary enrollment concept simply fails
as a viable solution because it lacks the force of law.
The second fatal flaw in the Keeton position is that, taken to its logical
conclusion, it would jeopardize all constitutional freedoms in academia.174
For the voluntary enrollment notion has no principled limitation, nor did the
Eleventh Circuit suggest one. If by enrolling at a public university a student
automatically waives her right to be free from compelled speech, then the
university could force her to lobby for legislation, campaign for a political
candidate, or pledge allegiance to a particular state-endorsed viewpoint. And
why does her enrollment decision not also effectively waive all of her other
First Amendment rights, like her freedom to worship, her right to assemble

168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 878.
See generally Martins, supra note 69, at 171–75.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
By 1972, the Supreme Court stated this principle had been firmly established for “at least a quartercentury.” Id. Accordingly, the doctrine has been a constitutional fixture for at least seventy years.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969).
See generally Martins, supra note 69, at 186–92.
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peaceably, and her right to petition her government for redress of grievances?175 Moreover, on what grounds would other rights—such as due process, privacy, and equal protection—be safe? The simple answer is that no
liberty would be secure, for “[i]f the state may compel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
a surrender of all.”176 Such a constitutional forfeiture would be unthinkable
anywhere, but it is particularly so on the public university campus, which is
the quintessential “marketplace of ideas.”177
The Eleventh Circuit erred when it held that compelled curricular speech
claims should receive no federal remedy. The holding violates established
First Amendment law and calls into question virtually all student liberty on
campus. For these reasons, the Keeton court’s voluntary enrollment theory
cannot stand as a viable challenge to the model proposed in this Article.
B. Government Speech
A more serious contender may be found in the assertion that a public university’s curriculum is a form of government speech178 over which educators
may exercise substantial control.179 This argument relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood. This contention recognizes that student
175

176
177
178
179

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quotation omitted).
See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Curriculum choices are a form of school
speech . . . .”).
A more extreme form of this argument contends that the government has total control over the
curriculum, including student responses thereto. But this argument is quickly laid to rest. Some
federal courts have recognized that the curriculum is a form of government speech. And the Supreme Court has strongly implied that First Amendment protection for extracurricular student speech
would not be the same were the government speaking through its curriculum.
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its
agents or employees, or—of particular importance—its faculty, are subject to the First
Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in
its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse
faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. The Court has not held, or
suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000) (citation
omitted) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
However, student responses to curricular requirements are student speech, not government
speech, and are therefore not subject to total state control. Logic alone tells us that students do not
become state speakers simply by attending public schools. If this were the case, students would
become the mouthpiece of the state every time they spoke pursuant to a class assignment. Accordingly, when the professor grades such speech, she would actually be evaluating the institution rather
than the student. This is simply not the reality of the college classroom. Instead, the law has followed logic and courts have recognized that “[t]hings that students express in class or in assignments
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responses to curricular assignments are a form of student speech but maintains
that the school must be free not to promote certain student speech related to the
curriculum because it bears the “imprimatur” of the university.180 Federal
courts, under this view, must only apply minimal judicial scrutiny when public
university officials exercise editorial control over the content of such “schoolsponsored” student speech.181 Applying this standard broadly, the Axson-Flynn
and Ward appellate courts ruled that a university official may compel curricular student speech as long as that decision is “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns”182 and not a “pretext” for discrimination.183

180

181

182

183

when called upon to express their own views . . . do not represent ‘the [school’s] own speech.’” See
C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); accord Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (recognizing both that the production of the student newspaper was part of the school’s curriculum but also that the articles written
by the students were “student speech”); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734–35, 738 (6th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that a student’s request for a referral to not provide counseling in a university counseling clinic that contradicted her religious beliefs was student speech); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that lines delivered in a student play were student
speech); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a master’s thesis was
student speech). And the law has accordingly not granted schools absolute authority over such
speech, requiring instead that public educators justify curricular decisions with at least “legitimate
pedagogical concerns.” See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Ward, 667 F.3d at 733; Axson-Flynn, 356
F.3d at 1285; Brown, 308 F.3d at 948. Consequently, a public university does not have absolute
curricular authority to force its students to affirm offensive beliefs.
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the question whether
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression
that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators’
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71.
The third type of speech is “school-sponsored speech,” which is “speech that a school ‘affirmatively . . . promotes,’ as opposed to speech that it ‘tolerates.’” “‘Expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school’ constitute school-sponsored speech, over which the school may
exercise editorial control, ‘so long as [its] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’” We conclude that Axson-Flynn’s speech in this case constitutes
“school-sponsored speech” and is thus governed by Hazelwood.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285 (citations omitted).
Ward, 667 F.3d at 733 (“Public educators may limit ‘student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”); see
also Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (“Accordingly, we hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable
in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”).
See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the
classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race,
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.”
(quoting Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995))); see also Ward, 667 F.3d
at 734 (“Although educators may ‘limit[ ]’ or ‘grade[ ] speech in the classroom in the name of
learning,’ and although they may control their own speech and curriculum, the First Amendment
does not permit educators to invoke curriculum ‘as a pretext for punishing [a] student for her . . . religion.’ Even in the context of a secular university, religious speech is still speech, and discriminating
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The Tenth and Sixth Circuits erred by applying this deferential test as
the standard for all compelled curricular speech claims because they failed to
recognize the critical difference between compelled speech and compelled
silence. The courts adopted this test from Hazelwood, in which the Supreme
Court rebuffed a claim that high school officials violated the First Amendment when they refused to publish various student essays in the school newspaper.184 Hazelwood, however, addresses curricular censorship rather than curricular compelled speech. The circuit courts erred by assuming that the two
were equivalent, and in doing so, overlooked controlling authority holding
that they are conceptually distinct.185 Indeed, Barnette expressly distinguished
between compelled silence and compelled speech when it overturned West
Virginia’s curricular pledge requirement:
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of
opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a
clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only
on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.186

The circuit courts did not need to stretch Hazelwood to manufacture a standard for compelled speech in the college classroom, for the Supreme Court

184
185

186

against the religious views of a student is not a legitimate end of a public school.” (citations omitted)).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263–64 (holding that school officials deleting two pages of the school newspaper because of decency concerns did not violate the First Amendment).
It is true that the Supreme Court has paid lip service to the idea that compelled speech and compelled silence are constitutionally equivalent. In Riley, the Court stated the following:
There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but
in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for
the First Amendment guarantees “freedom of speech,” a term necessarily comprising the
decision of both what to say and what not to say.
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988).
However, the Court here was not eliminating the conceptual differences between compelled
speech and compelled silence. Rather, the Court made this comment in direct response to North
Carolina’s contention that it had greater power to compel speech than to silence it. Understood in
this context, the Court’s statement simply affirmed that the freedom from compelled speech is entitled to no less protection than the freedom from censorship. See also Brandon C. Pond, To Speak
or Not to Speak: Theoretical Difficulties of Analyzing Compelled Speech Claims Under a Restricted Speech Standard,
10 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 149, 156 (2010). Nora Sullivan has adeptly noted that Wooley also contradicts the presumption that the “power to compel and the power to censor are coextensive.” Nora
Sullivan, Insincere Apologies: The Tenth Circuit’s Treatment of Compelled Speech in Public High Schools, 8 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (2010). The Wooley Court explained that “[t]he right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.”’ Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). Sullivan notes that the “term complementary
[is] defined as ‘mutually supplying each other’s lack.’” Sullivan, supra, at 548. Therefore, she concludes, “the Supreme Court’s description of compelled speech in Wooley signals that the First
Amendment safeguards against compulsion and censorship are not the same, but rather are two
different pieces of a puzzle that fit together to form complete protection for free speech.” Id. The
Axson-Flynn and Ward appellate courts should have recognized that the right to remain silent is protected at least as much and often to a greater degree than the right to speak.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
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already provided the proper standard in Barnette for compelled affirmations
of belief. There, the Court rejected the idea that public educators have as
much latitude to compel student speech as they do to suppress it. Barnette is
thus more precisely applicable than Hazelwood. And Barnette demands rigorous scrutiny when public schools utilize their curricula to compel students to
affirm a belief.
This is not to say that Hazelwood teaches nothing about how courts should
handle clashes between student speech and state curricula. As discussed in Subpart III.C., supra, it can be a helpful baseline standard to consider when university educators have not implicated Steps 1 through 3 of the proposed framework. Moreover, the opinion actually supports the application of strict scrutiny
to compelled speech claims falling under Steps 1 and 2. Hazelwood and Barnette
together affirm the rule that both the government and its citizens must be able
to disassociate from objectionable speech in the application of public school
curricula. Hazelwood addresses the first part of this equation, while Barnette addresses the second. Thus, the two opinions complement one another.
The chief concern of the Hazelwood majority was protecting the school
from being forced to promote speech that it did not want to endorse. This is
why the Court opened its legal analysis by distinguishing between student
speech that happens to occur on campus and “school-sponsored” student
speech that is “part of the school curriculum.”187 Regarding the latter, the
Justices explained that the First Amendment does not require public schools
to “promote particular student speech.”188 Consequently, a public school
can refuse to sponsor student speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’”189—such as speech that “might reasonably be perceived to
advocate . . . conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order,’” or that would “associate the school with . . . matters of
political controversy.”190 The Justices opined that public educators have
some power to regulate the content of such student speech so that “the views
of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”191 In
other words, the government has some authority to “disassociate itself” from
objectionable school-sponsored student speech.192
Hazelwood’s holding thus provides corollary support for students to likewise separate themselves from offensive curricular affirmations. For if the
187
188
189
190
191
192

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71.
Id. at 270–73.
Id. at 266 (holding that “a school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission’”).
Id. at 271–72 (citations omitted).
Id. at 271.
Id.; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (holding that it was
appropriate for a public school to discipline a student in order to disassociate itself from the “vulgar
and lewd speech” the student gave in a school assembly).
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government has the right to distance itself from certain student views, certainly students—who are protected by the First Amendment—have no less
right to disassociate themselves from odious government ideas. In this light,
Hazelwood stands as a kind of “reverse compelled speech” case that generally
prohibits a student, in the context of a curricular assignment, from compelling the school to endorse her ideas. And this prohibition extends beyond
actual endorsement even to student speech that “might reasonably be perceived” to carry the school’s approval.193 The Hazelwood court gave public
educators wide latitude to disassociate from such classroom speech. Federal
courts will only overturn those school decisions that lack a “legitimate pedagogical concern.”194 This places a heavy legal burden on any student wishing
to use a curricular exercise to bootstrap school endorsement (or apparent
endorsement) of her ideas.
Likewise, if Hazelwood is correct, the government should face no less of a
constitutional burden when it either seeks to compel a student to affirm a
belief or requires that student to speak a message that could be “erroneously
attributed” to the student.195 This heavy presumption against forced association is akin to the strict scrutiny standard explicitly applied in Barnette and
Wooley. Accordingly, Hazelwood, Barnette, and Wooley complement each other
by providing heightened protection from compulsory affirmation for both
the public school and the student.
If this were not the rule, we would have a serious anomaly in the law.
The government would have greater ability to disassociate itself from views
it does not want to endorse than private citizens would, even though private
citizens are expressly granted the freedom of speech. It is entirely inconsistent that the government would have more power to protect its speech
than the citizens who are specifically shielded from government overreach
by the Constitution.196 Consequently, Hazelwood’s minimal judicial scrutiny
193

194

195
196

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (holding that a school can “refuse to sponsor student speech that might
reasonably be perceived to advocate . . . ‘conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared values of
a civilized order’”).
Id. at 273 (holding that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
Id. at 271 (holding that educators have wider latitude in controlling student expression to make sure
that the “views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school”).
The Barnette majority made this point precisely when it sought to resolve the question raised in
Gobitis: “Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to
maintain its own existence?” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1943).
The Court’s answer was that individual liberty must prevail:
Government of limited power need not be anemic government. Assurance that rights are
secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel
safe to live under it makes for its better support. Without promise of a limiting Bill of
Rights it is doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered enough strength to enable its
ratification. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak government over strong
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is not the appropriate standard for courts to apply to all compelled speech
claims, and particularly not when public university curricula compel students
to affirm ideas—whether directly or apparently.
C. Educational Necessity
Notwithstanding Hazelwood, one could see how judges could conclude
that a deferential standard is necessary because the educational process requires professors to compel some student speech.197 The Axson-Flynn and
Ward appellate courts justified applying Hazelwood’s judicial standard on this
basis. The alternative, in their opinion, would grant individual students a
“veto” over the school’s curriculum.198 “[S]chools must be empowered at

197

198

government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in
preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing
and disastrous end.
Id. at 636–37.
See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (claiming “that schools must be
empowered at times to restrict the speech of their students for pedagogical purposes is not a controversial proposition”); see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“All educators
must be able ‘to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach.’
Just as a junior high school English teacher may fail a student who opts to express her thoughts
about a once-endangered species, say a platypus, in an essay about A Tale of Two Cities, so a law
professor may fail a student who opts to express her views about Salvador Dali and the fourth
dimension in a torts exam. That the First Amendment protects speech in the public square does
not mean it gives students the right to express themselves however, whenever and about whatever
they wish on school assignments or exams. ‘A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission.’” (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; then citing
Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995); then quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 266). A Supreme Court Justice and at least two other courts of appeals concur with this position.
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 242–43 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that at a university, “students are inevitably required to
support the expression of personally offensive viewpoints in ways that cannot be thought constitutionally objectionable unless one is prepared to deny the University its choice over what to teach”);
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Hazelwood . . . establish[es] that—consistent with
the First Amendment—a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a particular viewpoint, even if it is a view-point with which the student disagrees, so long as the requirement serves
a legitimate pedagogical purpose.”); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A. 1:95CV167–D–D, 1996
WL 671410, at *14 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) (“it is part of the function of schools to compel speech
from students to some degree so that officials can ensure that the students are in fact learning what
is taught”), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998).
See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292.
The school’s methodology may not be necessary to the achievement of its goals and it may
not even be the most effective means of teaching, but it can still be “reasonably related” to
pedagogical concerns. A more stringent standard would effectively give each student veto
power over curricular requirements, subjecting the curricular decisions of teachers to the
whims of what a particular student does or does not feel like learning on a given day. This
we decline to do.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 734 (“When a university lays out a program’s
curriculum or a class’s requirements for all to see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a
First Amendment veto over them.”).
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times to restrict the speech of their students for pedagogical purposes.”199
Consistent with this power, schools “routinely require students to express a
viewpoint that is not their own in order to teach the students to think critically.”200 The Axson-Flynn court provided the following examples of such permissible compulsion:
[A] college history teacher may demand a paper defending Prohibition, and
a law-school professor may assign students to write “opinions” showing how
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia would analyze a particular Fourth Amendment
question. . . . Such requirements are part of the teachers’ curricular mission
to encourage critical thinking . . . and to conform to professional norms . . . .201

Certainly, the teaching process would stall if students had a constitutional
right to refuse to respond to such questions and assignments. The First
Amendment does not permit individual students to hold the learning process
hostage. This conclusion, at least partially, drove the Axson-Flynn and Ward
courts to conclude that all compelled curricular speech claims are presumptively invalid.202
However, what this educational-necessity argument fails to recognize is
the critical difference between compelled comprehension and compelled affirmation. A constitutional chasm exists between “I understand” and “I believe.”
Absent a discriminatory motive and invasion of other rights, public universities may generally require the former, but they may not mandate the latter,
even to achieve curricular goals. Barnette explained this distinction explicitly:
[T]he State may “require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our government, including the
guaranties of civil liberty which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country.” Here, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare
a belief. They are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that
they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means. The issue here
is whether this slow and easily neglected route to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan.203

Educators can thus teach about a concept, such as the American flag, in order
to increase student learning. This power implies they may also expect students to show through words that they comprehend the given subject matter
in order to verify curricular objectives have been met and knowledge has
been obtained. For example, teachers may insist students provide facts about
199
200
201
202

203

Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290.
Id.
Id. at 1290–91 (quoting Brown, 308 F.3d at 953).
As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts both recognized that compelled student speech can raise interests protected by other constitutional rights. Because this Article agrees with that position, this Subpart will not emphasize it again here. Instead, this Subpart
will focus on challenging the position held by those courts that compelled curricular assignments
should never face strict scrutiny under the compelled speech doctrine.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (citation omitted) (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1943)).
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the flag on an exam to confirm their grasp of history. Likewise, they may
require students to orally defend a viewpoint in class regarding the flag that
is contrary to their own to demonstrate persuasive communication skills. But
professors are not free to “short-cut” this “slow and easily neglected” process
of persuasion by commanding students to adore the flag or the principles it
represents.204 This is where the forced pledge went too far.205 While teachers
may have authority to insist their students recite facts or even opinions to
teach a lesson, Barnette makes clear that the line between education and indoctrination is crossed when teachers force students to affirm a belief.206 And

204
205

206

Id. at 631.
Id. at 640 (“National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in
question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.”).
There is some precedent indicating that First Amendment protection is the same whether the government compels statements of fact or statements of opinion. Indeed, the Axson-Flynn appellate
court chastised the district court for holding that “statements of fact” were not entitled to protection
from disclosure under the First Amendment. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4. The Tenth
Circuit based its conclusion on Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., in which
the Supreme Court reviewed a state law requiring professional solicitors to disclose to potential
donors—before requesting funds—the percentage of such donations actually turned over to the
charity in the last twelve months. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
The Court voided the law under strict scrutiny, explaining that both “compelled statements of
opinion” and “compelled statements of fact” “burden[ ] protected speech.” See Riley, 487 U.S. at
797–98. But, as Laurent Sacharoff explains, Riley did not hold that facts always receive the same
disclosure protection as ideas:
Rather, [Riley] held that the government could not compel canvassers to reveal facts at the
doorstep. But the Court expressly said the government could compel charities to reveal
facts in a more general venue, such as directly to the state, which could then publicize them
to the public:
Further North Carolina may constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose certain
financial information to the State, as it has since 1981. . . . [And] as a general rule,
the State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to file. This procedure would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech during the
course of a solicitation.
Riley does not prohibit compelled disclosure of facts generally; rather, it only prohibits
compelled disclosures that are likely to suppress speech immediately as will occur on the
doorstep or telephone solicitation.
Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 409–10 (2008)
(footnotes omitted) (second alteration in original).
However, this is not to say that the government has a blank check to compel factual disclosures. The Tenth Circuit was correct in concluding that compelled statements of fact are not exempt from constitutional protection. In the public school context, surely teachers must demonstrate, at a minimum, a “legitimate pedagogical” interest in compelling students to reveal facts they
may wish to hide. A school that targets a student for disclosure based on his race, gender, religion,
or political affiliation would collide with Hazelwood, if not the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, Riley mandates that the state must not require factual disclosures that act as a prior restraint
on speech. The Ward court concurred in holding that educators may not target a student to suppress his speech. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Even in the context of a
secular university, religious speech is still speech, and discriminating against the religious views of a
student is not a legitimate end of a public school.”). As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, individuals
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as explained above in Subpart III.A.1., Wooley confirms that this threshold is
not only breached when the state purposefully impels a student to affirm an
idea, but also when it otherwise requires her to “disseminate an ideology”
such that her endorsement thereof is reasonably presumed.207 Therefore, an
assignment that requires a student to deliver a “Why I Love the Flag” speech
to a school assembly or a PTA meeting would—like the forced pledge—presumptively violate the First Amendment.
Understanding the line between comprehension and affirmation reveals
the incomplete logic in the reasoning of the Tenth and Sixth Circuits. They
reasoned that universities must have broad authority under the First Amendment to compel all student speech in order to teach effectively, subject only
to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”208 This is only partially true. Public
educators have some latitude to obligate student responses as long as they do
not compel students actually or apparently to affirm an ideological belief under Steps 1 and 2.209 When teachers merely insist that students comprehend
a lesson—as long as they do not violate other rights under Step 3—they are
generally entitled to a more lenient standard of review.210 However, when
affirmation is compelled, state educators must justify their assignments under
strict scrutiny, as required by Barnette and Wooley.
Applying this more comprehensive approach to the Axson-Flynn court’s hy-

207
208
209

210

and organizations may remain silent to protect other liberty interests such as privacy and association. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (“[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled
disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the
First Amendment.”).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
Ward, 667 F.3d at 733 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(quotations omitted); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290 (citations and quotations omitted).
At least one federal court of appeal has implicitly recognized this limitation on a public school’s
curricular authority to compel student speech. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159,
187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]hile a public educational institution may not demand that a student profess
beliefs or views with which the student does not agree, a school may in some circumstances require
a student to state the arguments that could be made in support of such beliefs or views.”). However,
because the court found that no official compulsion was present, the statement is largely dicta. Id.
at 189.
The Hazelwood standard prevents the state from using its curriculum as a pretext to discriminate
based on “race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion.” See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d
at 1287. By roughly mirroring the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it acts
as a baseline of constitutional protection under which the government may not tread. However,
the Hazelwood standard does not adequately address additional constitutional concerns that may
arise when public universities compel student speech. As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, forcing
students to speak can easily trespass onto the freedom of association and the right to privacy, for
example, even when no discriminatory purpose is present. Therefore, even if a public educator
compels student speech for “legitimate pedagogical” reasons, the reviewing court must still be mindful of other constitutional interests. This is simply one more reason why the blind application of
Hazelwood to all curricular compelled speech claims is unacceptable.
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potheticals, we can see how the prediction that heightened scrutiny will hamstring public education is greatly exaggerated. The theoretical history teacher
and law professor may indeed require their respective students to write papers
defending Prohibition, or analyzing how various justices might evaluate the
Fourth Amendment. Neither assignment (from the facts given) indicates that
the professors required their students to personally affirm any ideological belief about Prohibition or the Fourth Amendment. Nor are the assignments
given under auspices where others might reasonably perceive student endorsement of any such belief, for everyone understands that these classroom
assignments are academic in nature. And these exercises do not (on their face)
trespass on any other rights, such as privacy or association. The same reasoning would justify most questions that elicit student opinions in a quiz, examination, or class discussion. The Axson-Flynn and Ward courts are correct that
when student opinions are compelled under these circumstances, strict scrutiny is not triggered. However, when the school goes further and strong-arms
a student into endorsing an idea, it treads on constitutional thin ice.
The model proposed in this Article strikes a workable balance that respects
the public university’s curriculum as well as students’ constitutional rights. In
contrast, the one-size-fits-all employment of Hazelwood proposed by the Tenth
and Sixth Circuits fails to respect Barnette and Wooley by treating all compelled
student speech the same. In doing so, the appellate courts ignored the Supreme
Court’s admonishment that “[o]bservance of the limitations of the Constitution
will not weaken government in the field appropriate for its exercise.”211
D. University Deference
A related counterargument contends that judges should defer to professors on academic matters, including, but not limited to, the implementation
of curricular objectives. The Supreme Court asserted this position as a general proposition in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, in which the
court upheld the university’s decision to remove a student from its medical
school for academic reasons.212
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.213

211
212
213

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227–28 (1985).
Id. at 225 (footnote omitted).
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Several other cases214 and commentators215 affirm this general principle—
that judges should tread lightly when reviewing scholastic decisions. This is
due to the presumption that faculty members have greater training and competence in the academic field and thus are better suited than judges to assess
the validity of educational judgments.216 Instead, judges should avoid “substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of . . . the
school authorities.”217 The Axson-Flynn court relied on both Ewing and Hazelwood to conclude that this same academic deference must apply when
schools compel speech as part of a curricular assignment.218
Whatever the merits of such deference might be in the academy, the Supreme Court has never granted it to teachers in a compelled speech case. To
214

215

216
217
218

See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010) (“[The University’s] decisions about
the character of its student-group program are due decent respect.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that [racial] diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. . . . Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition
of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1978) (“The decision to dismiss
respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic judgment of school officials that she did not
have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative
than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision
of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination
whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking. Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators
and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing.”); Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University. Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this regard, we trust that the
University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in pursuit of academic freedom.”).
See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic
Freedom, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 996 (2009) (“Courts should defer to a decision made by an institution of
higher education if the institution can show that it was made on academic grounds.”); David M.
Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 287 (“[C]ourts should afford broad
deference to professional expertise. Academic decisions are necessarily subjective and beyond the
competence of judges. Courts cannot . . . ‘evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions.’”) (quoting
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 412 (2013) (“Indeed, even skeptics of broad claims of university autonomy tend to agree that universities should receive substantial deference in making core
academic decisions.”).
Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A Proposal for Heightened First Amendment Protection for the
Teaching and Scholarship of Public University Professors, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 687 (2016).
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686 (citation and quotations omitted).
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts must “give
‘substantial deference’ to ‘educators’ stated pedagogical concerns’” (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson
Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))); see also Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292–93 (“[W]e do not second-guess
the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator’s goal . . . .”).
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the contrary, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that such deference would be appropriate when educators prescribe orthodox thought.
In Barnette, the majority took pains to condemn Gobitis’ assertion that “this is
a field ‘where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence.’”219 Respect for school authorities had been the cornerstone of the
Court’s initial stance upholding the mandatory pledge.220 The Barnette majority proceeded to ignore the state’s asserted interests in “increasing [students’] knowledge of . . . the government” and applied its harshest scrutiny
to the pledge.221 This is a far cry from deferential jurisprudence.
The Court has likewise withheld deference from other state compulsory
efforts where even the risk of misattribution was present. As discussed supra,
the Court refused to defer to New Hampshire’s interest in categorizing motor
vehicles in Wooley222 and Massachusetts’s interest in preventing discrimination in Hurley.223 In neither case were the plaintiffs personally required to
mouth objectionable ideological messages. However, because the state
forced these plaintiffs to associate “intimately”224 with personally objectionable ideas, endorsement could easily be attributed to them.225 By applying
strict scrutiny in both cases, the Court signaled that freedom of the mind is
one liberty too precious to expose to minimal judicial review.
Withholding deference from such curricular decisions would be consistent with the courts’ current refusal to show any special respect, in the related Establishment Clause context, for curricular decisions that compel students to participate in religious activities. For example, the Supreme Court
invalidated a public school curricular exercise that forced students to recite a

219
220

221
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225

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597–98 (1943)).
See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598 (stating that “[t]he wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by
those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our
independent judgment. . . . [T]he courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational
policy.”).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.1.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995).
Id. at 576 (explaining that a speaker who has an intimate connection with a particular view or
communication loses the autonomy of his speech if he is forced to express ideas relating to that view
which are contrary to his own).
Id. at 575 (“GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s
customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of
presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“New Hampshire’s
statute in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the
State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty, as Maynard already has. As a condition to driving
an automobile—a virtual necessity for most Americans—the Maynards must display ‘Live Free or
Die’ to hundreds of people each day. . . . The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire
commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”).
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school-prescribed prayer226 as well as one that required Bible reading and
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.227 In neither case did the Court give any
weight to the schools’ asserted pedagogical justifications,228 and in the latter
case, the majority specified that it was explicitly reversing the prior “governing principle of nearly complete deference to administrative discretion.”229
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to grant
federal educators any deference when it voided mandatory chapel attendance at three of the nation’s preeminent military academies.230 This is particularly significant given that the federal government is often granted deference over matters pertinent to military training.231 The coerced prayers and
forced participation in religious activities in these cases are directly analogous
to the mandatory pledge in Barnette.232 In each case, however, while these
exercises were part of the curriculum, none of the respective courts subjected
them to deferential review or even mentioned the need to defer to educators.

226

227

228

229
230

231

232

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that “New York’s program of daily classroom
invocation of God’s blessings” constituted “a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause”).
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (explaining that the Bible reading and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer was “prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students” and holding that such “exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause”).
See id. at 223–24 (ignoring the state’s contention that the prayers were justified by secular purposes,
including the “promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times,
the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature”); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 425
(ignoring the Board of Regents of New York’s attempt to justify the prayer as a shared part of the
community’s “spiritual heritage”).
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 275.
See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding unconstitutional mandatory
chapel attendance at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, the United States Naval
Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs,
Colorado). In reversing the district court, the court of appeals noted that the district court’s grant
of deference “to the unique role of the military” was inappropriate. Id. at 293.
See id. at 294–95 (“Personal freedoms of conduct and appearance have been accommodated to the
military’s perceived need to establish procedures best suited to regulate its day-to-day operations,
duty assignments and call-up orders; to determine a reservist’s discharge of his duties; to regulate
physical appearance; and to ascertain ‘the essential characteristics of fitness for duty.’ This deference to military decisionmaking has been justified by the military’s role, its mandate to prepare for
the waging of war, and the necessity of this mandate for our national security. However, deference
has inherent limitations which have also been fully recognized in judicial decision. . . . Individual
freedom may not be sacrificed to military interests to the point that constitutional rights are abolished.” (footnotes omitted)).
In Anderson, the court flatly rejected the government’s attempt to distinguish “compelling attendance
at church and compelling worship or belief.” Id. at 291.
Neither appellees, nor the dissenting opinion infra, reveal how a government could possibly compel individual worship or belief other than by compelling certain overt actions—
for example, profession of belief in God; recitation of prayers; or mere presence during
Bible readings. Attendance during chapel services is indistinguishable from these other
overt actions, the compulsion of which has been declared unconstitutional in Torcaso v.
Watkins, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, and Engel v. Vitale.
Id.
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Therefore, the appeal to university deference, like the related appeals for
lower scrutiny, is simply not persuasive when public educators compel affirmation of ideas either actually or apparently.
V. THE PROPOSAL IN PRACTICE
This Article proposes a sound and comprehensive method for addressing
compelled curricular speech claims in the public university setting. Contrary
to the standards proposed by some commentators and the three appellate
courts that have addressed the issue, this Article maintains that courts should
apply a nuanced standard that affords universities much less deference when
they compel student speech. Accordingly, a court hearing a student’s claim
that her public university employed its curriculum to force her to speak
against her will should utilize the framework explained in Part II.
This framework is obviously far less deferential to university officials than
the blanket Hazelwood standard applied by the Axson-Flynn and Ward courts.
Yet this model is justified because it more fully respects the constitutional
rights of the student and more carefully delineates the limits on state power
over the mind. Its true impact can be seen when it is applied to the hypothetical students Abigail and Lauren introduced at the beginning of the Article, and to the plaintiffs in Axson-Flynn and Ward.
A. Abigail and Lauren
Over her objections, Abigail’s college has required her to sign its “Statement of Diversity and Social Justice” as a condition of receiving her teaching
degree. The college is clearly using its curriculum to force her to endorse
certain ideas she opposes. Moreover, this statement and its tenets are patently ideological in nature, as reasonable minds would likely disagree on
what constitutes “diversity” and “social justice.” If Abigail challenged this
requirement in court, she would likely prevail under the model proposed in
this Article. By forcing Abigail to demonstrate her “respect” for diversity and
her “commitment” to social justice, as understood by college officials, the
college has transgressed the threshold inquiry by purposefully compelling her
to affirm an ideology—the approach explicitly condemned by Barnette. This
is the quintessential example of a government-imposed orthodoxy that no
government officials—including educators—are permitted to enforce under
the First Amendment.
In contrast, Lauren’s professor of political advocacy would likely survive
the first step of the proposed framework, even though he has compelled her
to support legislation that she personally opposes. He could convincingly
argue that he has required his students to petition the state legislature not to
force them to affirm any ideas about guns, but rather to provide them with
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real-life experience in grassroots political advocacy. While his purpose may
be legitimate, the assignment should still trigger strict scrutiny under the second step of the proposed model because it has the effect of communicating
her support for HB 1122 to others. Any legislator receiving Lauren’s letter
would reasonably perceive that she endorses the bill, because the letter bears
her name and is thus intimately associated with her. Lauren’s university cannot defend on the grounds that she does not actually endorse the viewpoint
in the letter. Wooley and Hurley presumptively condemn the letter-writing
activity because it forces Lauren to serve as a “courier for [the State’s] message.”233 Indeed, this can easily occur anytime assignments require students
to communicate to third parties unaffiliated with the school, such as in a
clinic or internship. Lauren’s professor might try to justify the intrusion, but
this would be a tall order. If EMU’s interests in teaching professional ethical
codes and avoiding loss of accreditation were insufficiently weighty in Ward,
it is difficult to imagine what interest Lauren’s university could offer to satisfy
this step.234 Even if the professor could conceivably produce a compelling
interest, the assignment would still fail because accommodating Lauren’s objections by permitting her not to send the letter to the legislature would surely
be a less restrictive means of achieving the professor’s goals.
Therefore, under the first two steps of the proposed framework, it is
highly unlikely that either curricular mandate would survive judicial review.
In fact, a federal court applying this analysis would likely grant summary
judgment in favor of Abigail and Lauren, respectively.
B. Ward and Axson-Flynn
While the facts in the Ward case are more complex, EMU’s expulsion of
Julea Ward would also likely fail the second step. EMU expelled Ward for
refusing to voice the university’s preferred message on sexual ethics to a third
party in the school’s counseling clinic. Sexual ethics and other values-based
matters are clearly ideological, and as the Sixth Circuit noted, they have generated significant debate even within the mental health profession itself.235
Furthermore, any person receiving counsel on sexual issues from Ward at
EMU (i.e., counseling in line with EMU’s imposed values) would reasonably
conclude that Ward supports the guidance she is providing—first, because of
the fact that Ward herself is speaking (and absent confounding circumstances,
233
234
235

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (finding that the state interest in disseminating a
particular ideology “cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right[s]”).
See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (confirming that the state interests articulated
by EMU could not satisfy strict scrutiny).
See id. at 735–36 (noting disagreement among various counseling professionals on the permissibility
of referrals when the counselor disagrees with the values of the client, specifically those related to
sexual orientation).
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people usually assume that others believe what they verbalize), and second,
because of the unique standards of speech in a counseling environment (counselors are bound by ethical codes to avoid causing harm and to always promote the good of the client).236 Any client can thus rationally presume that
the speaking professional endorses her own counsel, at least to the extent that
it is beneficial and not harmful. Because Ward’s client would likely perceive
that Ward was personally endorsing the position on sexual ethics that she provided (the one forced on her by EMU), the university infringed upon her freedom of mind. Consequently, the judges should have applied strict scrutiny to
the expulsion decision and ruled in Ward’s favor, given that the university
effectively conceded its interests were not compelling.237 Thus, the university
would not have even reached Step 4 in the proposed analysis.
Unlike the examples above, Christina Axson-Flynn’s compelled speech
claim would have satisfied the first two inquiries of the proposed framework.
University of Utah officials could pass the threshold inquiry on the grounds
that they did not assign the offensive script for the purpose of forcing her to
endorse any ideas contained in it. The Tenth Circuit found no evidence to
the contrary. The script requirement would also survive the effect step, because no one would reasonably assume Axson-Flynn’s affirmation of the ideas
in the script for the simple reason that she was acting.238 The very nature of
acting inherently dilutes the association between the speaker and the views
expressed by his or her character; consequently, there was no reasonable risk
that others might presume that Axson-Flynn endorsed the objectionable lines.
Thus, there was no need to apply strict scrutiny under the second step.
The Court appropriately considered whether the script requirement
jeopardized other constitutional rights, and concluded that Axson-Flynn had
raised a colorable free-exercise claim that entitled her to a jury trial.239 The
proper scrutiny then depended upon the nature of the script requirement.
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See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS, at 3 (AM. COUNSELING ASS’N 2014) (stating that among “[t]he fundamental principles of professional ethical behavior are . . . nonmaleficence, or avoiding actions that
cause harm [and] beneficence, or working for the good of the individual and society by promoting
mental health and well-being . . . .”).
See Ward, 667 F.3d at 740 (stating that “[t]he university does not argue that its actions can withstand
strict scrutiny, and we agree. Whatever interest the university served by expelling Ward, it falls
short of compelling”).
Of course, even in the acting context, a university’s acting curriculum has constitutional limits. For
example, a school could not require an objecting student to disrobe as part of her performance as
this mandate would likely infringe upon the student’s right to privacy. This is one more example
that shows the importance of Step 3 in the proposed analysis.
See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the factfinder
needed to resolve the issue of whether or not the law requiring Axson-Flynn “to say words whose
utterance would violate her religious beliefs” was neutral, which would elicit a rational basis review,
or pretextual, which would require strict scrutiny).
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The Free Exercise Clause would permit rational-basis review if the script obligation was “neutral and generally applicable”—but the clause would impose strict scrutiny if the school permitted “individualized exemptions.”240
This is yet another example of the importance of Step 3 in protecting the
rights of dissenting university students.
Only after considering these inquiries, however, should the Tenth Circuit
have proceeded to the fourth and final step in the proposed analysis. And
even then, the court should have applied a more potent version of Hazelwood
scrutiny that accounted for the nature of the university and the adult students
that study there. These analytical errors aside, the court properly concluded
that Axson-Flynn was entitled to a trial because there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that the script mandate was motivated by religious
animus.241 The outcome of the script requirement would then have been
resolved at trial. If the jury trusted Axson-Flynn, the curtain would close, so
to speak, but if the jury believed the university, the show would go on.
Applying the proposed framework to the foregoing hypotheticals and
cases reveals that the real potency of the proposed model exists in the first
two steps. Indeed, Lauren and Abigail would likely have lost if their respective universities had needed only to produce any “legitimate pedagogical”
interest. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit probably would have granted summary
judgment to the plaintiff in Ward given the university’s concession that it
could not survive strict scrutiny. Even if there were genuine factual issues to
be resolved by a jury, the proposed model would have drastically improved
Ward’s chances of prevailing at trial by raising the university’s burden significantly. Finally, the proposed model would have had little effect, if any, upon
the appellate decision or any subsequent trial in Axson-Flynn, given the unique
nature of the University of Utah’s curricular speech assignment. However,
what cannot be gainsaid is the effect this framework would have on the litigation expectations of both students and universities by effectively reversing
the presumption of deference (i.e., away from the university). Adoption of
this framework would produce a seismic shift in expectations, with the result
that public universities would have to tread more carefully when they require

240
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See id. at 1294–95; 1297–98 (discussing the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the plaintiff’s
claim under the free exercise of religion clause, and finding that a rule that is discriminatorily motivated is not a rule of general applicability; that even if the rule is one of general applicability, it
may still require strict scrutiny if it falls under one of two exceptions: a hybrid rights exception, for
which a plaintiff must demonstrate a “fair probability or a likelihood” of success on an accompanying constitutional claim, and an individualized-exemption exception, for which a plaintiff must
demonstrate that she is forced to choose between “following the precepts of her religion” and complying with a legal requirement).
See id. at 1293 (concluding that “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to AxsonFlynn, . . . there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ justification for
the script adherence requirement was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious
discrimination. Therefore, summary judgment was improper.”).
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students to advocate for potentially offensive ideological positions. And if
colleges were to tread on such shaky constitutional soil, they could anticipate
more settlements, summary judgments, and jury verdicts . . . in favor of the
objecting students.
CONCLUSION
When a public university uses its curriculum to force a student to affirm
an ideology that the student finds personally offensive, that assignment must
be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court directly affirmed this position in Barnette and expanded the doctrine in Wooley to include
even apparent affirmations of belief. The Court has further confirmed this
high standard in other cases—cases in which a citizen forced to profess a belief
claimed violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and
the freedom of association. Moreover, the foundational principles supporting
the First Amendment yield a similar conclusion: the opinions of men are presumed to lie beyond the state’s power to control.
Even when a public university does not purposefully employ its curriculum to coerce students, it may still trigger heightened constitutional review.
Forced disclosures of fact or opinion can easily tread upon, among other
rights, the rights of association, privacy, due process, and religious freedom.
Historically, official mandates that activate one of these freedoms have faced
close judicial scrutiny.
A few courts, namely the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, appear to
have reversed this presumption in favor of a more lenient standard that
overtly defers to the curricular decisions of public educators. However, the
justifications for more deferential standards are simply unpersuasive. Students who choose to attend state universities do not waive their rights under
the compelled speech doctrine any more than they waive other First Amendment freedoms. In addition, a blanket application of Hazelwood to compelled
curricular speech claims ignores the fundamental differences between compelled speech and compelled silence. Such overbroad use of this test also
overlooks the fundamental differences in the constitutional protection afforded to minors in grade schools and adults in universities. Likewise, those
who prophesy that demanding scrutiny will doom public education fail to
understand the distinction between permissible comprehension and unconstitutional affirmation. Finally, any presumption that judges are incompetent
to review academic decisions simply does not apply when state educators
compel affirmation of belief.
Overall, these objections fail because they miss the larger picture. While
a state university provides an education, it is ultimately an arm of the gov-

136

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:1

ernment, and the Constitution imposes fundamental limitations on that entity’s power.242 When the state tries to compel citizens to adopt its views as
orthodox, it “invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which . . . [is] reserve[d] from all official control.”243 This is true whether the government
official is a prince, a president, or a professor. We recognize this principle
when officials violate the rights of those driving in cars and marching in parades. It is time to recognize anew that this principle also covers those studying in the college classroom. The one fixed star in our constitutional constellation demands no less.

242
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See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The public schools are
invaluable and beneficent institutions, but they are, after all, organs of the State. When public
school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State . . . .”).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (finding that the State requirement
of a “flag salute and pledge” violated the First Amendment).

